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I. Introduction
There has been a recent revival in interest in the doctrine of
odious debt in legal, policy, and economic quarters.1  One
precursor to the present article is a working paper posted by the
Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL),
substantially completed in 2001, revised slightly and posted in
2003.2 It defined an odious debt as one that met three criteria: it
was contracted without the consent of the population of a debtor
state, without benefit to it, and the creditor had knowledge of the
circumstances. Shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,
senior members of the U.S. administration, such as Richard Perle
and Paul Wolfowitz, together with ambiguous support in leading
periodicals, claimed briefly that the debts of the Saddam Hussein
regime ought to be considered odious and thus be cancelled.3 This
I See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, & Robert B. Thompson, The
Dilemma of Odious Debts, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001567/; Joseph Hanlon, Defining 'Illegitimate
Debt': When Creditors Should be Liable for Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE
CROSSROADS 109 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006); Christoph G. Paulus,
'Odious Debts' vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 83 (2005); Anna
Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391
(2005); Emily F. Mancina, Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: Resurrecting the
Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1239 (2004);
Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004). Adam Feibelman,
Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727 (2007); Michael Kremer,
Seema Jayachandran, & Jonathan Shafter, Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine while
Preserving Legitimate Lending, Dec. 2005 (Blue Sky Conference, Ctr. for Int'l Dev.,
Harvard Univ.), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/bluesky/papers/jayachandran
_odiousdebtL0609.pdf.
2 See Jeff King, The Odious Debt Doctrine in International Law: Definition and
Evidence, in Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt
Doctrine 13-52 (CJSDL Working Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available at
http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf.
3 See Pentagon Adviser Perle: Private Sector Key to Iraqi Recovery, 53 THE OIL
[Vol. XXII
ODIOUS DEBT: THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE
led to a revival in academic interest in the relatively obscure
doctrine.
This article is not a defense of the odious debt doctrine or a
reply to criticisms of my earlier paper. After the volume of recent
criticism, depth of recent research on the project, and a variety of
new proposals, such a task would require a much lengthier
response, and indeed, such a response is now nearing completion.4
The purpose of this article is rather to define the doctrine with
some precision, discuss the principal authorities in international
law, and identify key issues that are faced by those who would
critique or advocate the doctrine in international practice. In short,
it is an attempt to bring critics and advocates to terms in this
debate, and to provide a somewhat precise examination of the
genealogy and present usage of the doctrine.
In Part II, I examine the basic rules regarding whether and in
what circumstances states are said to be obliged to repay public
debts. I show how the nature of the odious debt claim is meant to
serve as an exception to these rules, that the rule is very infirm in
cases of state succession, but well established-subject to some
qualifications-in cases of government succession. In Part III, I
examine the historical origins of the doctrine, survey three
influential definitions, examine two accepted types of odious debt,
and then articulate the present usage of the doctrine and highlight
the controversial issues it comports. In Part IV, I examine the
ways in which the doctrine has been instantiated in the various
sources of international law, without entering too deeply on the
merits of the more controversial cases.
Part V moves on to consider key issues facing both advocates
and critics of the doctrine. It addresses the issue of odious debt
DAILY No. 112, June 12, 2003, available at WL6518177; Gelpern, supra note 1, at 403;
Patricia Adams, Iraq's Odious Debts 16-17 (Cato Institute No. 526, 2004); Joe Siegle,
After Iraq Let's Forgive Some Other Debts, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 2004, at 6;
Jeff King, Saddam's Evil Debts, FINANCIAL POST (Can.), Oct. 23, 2003, at FP 15; Those
Odious Debts, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18-24, 2003. But see Iraq's Debt: The US Should
Beware the Principle of Odious Lending, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), June 16, 2003, at
20 (contending that the doctrine of odious debt is unworkable).
4 I will shortly circulate a draft paper entitled 'The International Law of Odious
Debt: A Restatement' which contains a thorough restatement of the doctrine, review of
historical practice, and defense of various positions alluded to the pages below
[hereinafter Restatement].
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claims in cases of government succession, proposes to clarify
debate by recognizing four categories of odious debt, examines
how courts can or have assessed "public benefit," and then
criticizes a prominent alternative model for addressing odious
debts. Part VI picks up the gauntlet laid down by critics, and
throws one down to creditors, by showing how, whatever the legal
status of the doctrine at present, creditors can avoid odious lending
in a predictable, cost-effective way that would not destabilize
lending. Given this conclusion, one is led inevitably to infer that it
is both morally right and pragmatically sensible that creditors
begin to use such lending methods, particularly considering the
growing shadow cast by the odious debt debate.
II. The Rule of Repayment in State and Government
Succession
A. The Nature of the Burden of Proof
It must be recalled that under the contemporary definition, as
examined below, a debt is said to be odious when there is an
absence of popular consent, an absence of benefit, and creditor
awareness of these two elements.5 The doctrine of odious debt is
not purported to be a rule of international law as such. No one
claims that it would be illegal to repay odious debts. Yet some
writers continue to suggest that instances of non-payment of
odious debts must satisfy the thresholds in customary international
law of uniformity, consistency and generality of practice, together
with the requisite opinio juris. This misunderstands the nature of
the burden at issue. Many countries have found it necessary and
expedient to repay odious debts. The odious debt claim is rather
that the doctrine amounts to a qualification, or exception, to the
rule that public debts of predecessor governments and states must
be repaid. Absence of uniformity, consistency, and generality of
practice, or absence of opinio juris of that alleged rule of
repayment is what advocates of the doctrine must prove. The
difference is significant. A fluctuation in practice, or absence of
5 See infra Part III.C
6 "[T]he principle would have to have been applied over a longer period and
would have to be recognised as a legal obligation." Paulus, supra note 1, at 86; see id. at
91 ("legally binding doctrine of 'odious debts"'); Mancina, supra note 1, at 1252-53.
(Vol. XXXII
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opinio juris, in respect of repayment of odious debts, rather than a
simple assertion of the doctrine, is the threshold that must be
crossed. This is of course the only way that so few precedents
have managed to convince a number of public international law
scholars that odious debts are not apportioned in cases of state
succession. Establishing whether such an exception exists
requires examining the general rule that public debts remain
enforceable upon changes in sovereignty or government. For the
sake of simplicity, I will call this the 'rule of repayment' and seek
in this Part to briefly review its legal foundations. The rule can be
asserted in two different contexts: state succession and
government succession. Quite apart from the relevance of odious
debt, the "rule" is very infirm, if at all existent, in the former case,
but well entrenched in the latter case.
B. The Rule of Repayment in State Succession
State succession occurs when "one State is replaced by another
in its responsibility for the international relations of a territory."7
This typically occurs by way of cession or annexation, through the
dissolution of a state, unification of states, or emergence of a new
state.' There has historically been an acute concern in the
perennial warring between European states that the "law of peace"
provide rules for the peaceful determination of responsibility for
debts of ceded and annexed territories. Despite this concern, it is
still far from settled law that a successor state is liable for the
debts of the predecessor state.9 Despite the fact that the present
7 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 2(l)(b),
Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3, 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1490 (1978), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 971
(1978); see also O'CONNELL, infra note 12, at 3; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 621 (6th ed. 2003) ("[s]tate succession arises when there is a
definitive replacement of one state by another in respect of sovereignty over a given
territory in conformity with international law").
8 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, art. 37-41, Apr. 8, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983); MALCOLM SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 864 (5th ed. 2003).
9 BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 625-26; see SHAW, supra note 8, at 900-04; West
Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. The King, 2 K.B. 391(1905); Ottoman Debt
Arbitration, 1 R.I.A.A. 529, 573 (1925); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 159 (6th ed.
1963); CHARLES ROUSSEAU, 3 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 426-70 (1977);
Interpretation of Art. 78, Para. 7, of the Peace Treaty with Italy, 1947 (Franco-Ethiopian
Railway Company Claim), 24 I.L.R. 602, 629 (1957). For more recent examples, see
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virtual consensus is that there is no settled rule of automatic
succession, commentators often assume the existence of such a
rule as their starting point.'0
The early "universal theory," advocated by Grotius and
Pufendorf, suggested all debts pass with the change of sovereignty
over territory." This was rejected by what public international law
scholar Daniel Patrick O'Connell grouped together as "negative
theories," namely, those that denied the existence of any legal
succession of debts. 12 Shortly after World War I, and in the wake
of erratic state practice, two in-depth treatises were completed on
the subject of public debts and state succession. 3 To this day,
Yucyco Ltd. v Republic of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dicta
claiming the rule of repayment is far from established); see also 767 Third Ave. Assoc.
v. Consultate General of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F 3d. 152, 158
(2d Cir. 2000) (finding that international law did not support landlord's claim that
successor state automatically became liable to landlords); G. Aquaviva, The Dissolution
of Yugoslavia and the Fate of Its Financial Obligations, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
93, 93-136 (2002) (reporting a general but very highly qualified obligation); see
generally P. Williams & J. Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The Modem
Law and Policy, 42 HARv. INT'L L.J. 355 (2001) (arguing modem practice is so nuanced
that a general rule of repayment would be a gross simplification); Final Report:
Economic Aspects of State Succession, in INT'L LAW Assoc. 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Aspects%20of%20State%20Succession/Final%2OReport%
202006.pdf ("[T]he rules of succession in respect of State debts are disputed, the practice
is extremely differentiated, and the formulation of conclusions as to the possible
customary nature of various rules is very difficult.") [hereinafter ILA Final Report].
10 See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 5; Paulus, supra note 1, at 88.
11 See ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 25-30
(1931).
12 See 1 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (1967); J. Foorman & M. Jehle, Effects of State and
Government Succession on Commercial Bank Loans to Foreign Sovereign Borrowers, 1
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 9, 11-12 (1982); M. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections
Upon the History of the International Law of Public Debt in Connection with State
Succession, 1 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 39, 42-47 (1982). The leading theory was propounded
by A.B. Keith, who, as Hoeflich explains, O'Connell considered an apologist for the
British Foreign Office, while Hoeflich himself regarded Keith as a valuable and
overlooked analyst. See A.B. KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION 1-7 (1907); see
also Hoeflich, id. at 42, 67.
13 See generally ALEXANDER NAHUM SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES
ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCILRES (1927);
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11 (discussing, among other things, the treatment of public
debts in territorial changes). In a published review, Sack called Feilchenfeld's treatise
"one of the most scholarly works written on any subject of international law." A.N.
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they remain the two most extensive studies of the subject, 14 though
it seems that state practice has not validated the general
conclusions advanced by either of them. The first was completed
by Alexander Nahum Sack in 1927. Though Sack was the first
writer to formulate the doctrine of odious debt in those exact
terms, his general project was to assert the existence of a general
rule of repayment. At the same time, Ernst Feilchenfeld, a
German working at Harvard University in the 1920s, completed
his compendious work in 1931, in which he advocated a rule of
maintenance based on his extensive review of state practice.
Though Feilchenfeld found the doctrine of odious debts to be
questionable as a matter of positive international law, he did find it
relevant as an equitable or justice-based consideration. 5 Yet
another highly influential theory of state succession and public
debt was proposed by O'Connell in the context of state succession
more generally. 16  O'Connell acknowledged that since legal
continuity is extinguished in cases of succession, there is a need
for a theory other than the idea of pacta sunt servanda, or, that
agreements shall be honored to justify the assumption of debts.
He chose the idea of equity: "[t]he formal contractual relationship
may have expired but the equity has not."' 7  He*thus relied on
Sack, Public Debts and State Succession, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 608, 623 (1931-1932)
(reviewing ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION (1931)).
There is no discussion in the review of their disagreement about the nature of odious
debt. See id.
14 For a recent addition that also discusses Sack and Feilchenfeld, see TAI-HENG
CHENG, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS 13-25 (2006).
15 See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
16 O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 12.
17 1 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (2d ed. 1970). O'Connell
examines debt and casts doubt on it. See id. at 369-87.
The problem is complicated by some uncertainty concerning the extent to which
international law protects the rights of creditors to performance, but, subject to
what will be said on this topic later, it may be taken that international law does
not permit a State by an exercise of municipal law to ignore its debt obligations,
whether it has 'inherited' them or not. The problem is different and more acute
if the debtor State retains its international personality but as a result of loss of
territory becomes economically disabled in the a matter of debt amortization.
Id. at 384.
O'Connell continues to refer to instances of non-assumption, they being the cases most
often discussed in the context of odious debt. Id. at 384-85.
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equitable notions of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment to
advance the thesis that creditors retain acquired rights that enable
them to claim debts in cases of succession. ' 8 Though the idea is
based on an equitable doctrine, unfortunately the author does not
address the corollary domestic law concept that one must come to
equity with clean hands.' 9
Shortly after the publication of O'Connell's work, the
International Law Commission (ILC) began its attempt to codify
the law relating to state succession in matters of state property,
archives, and public debts.2z  The attempt proceeded on the
submission of a series of reports by Special Rapporteur
Mohammed Bedjaoui (later judge and then President of the
International Court of Justice), the adoption of a draft ILC
Convention with commentary, and then revisions and adoption of
a final text by a conference of plenipotentiaries. 2' The General
Assembly later adopted the Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts (the
Vienna Convention).2  The Vienna Convention as ultimately
adopted provided rules for how debts to other states (though not to
private creditors, to the chagrin of rich creditor states) shall pass in
various categories of state succession:
" Transfer of a part of the territory of a state (previously known
as cession) (article 37): by agreement or debts pass in
equitable proportions;
" Newly independent states23 (article 38): no debt passes absent
agreement, and any agreement must comply with the right of
18 See O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 375-76; see also Hoeflich, supra note 12, at
45-47; Foorman, supra note 12, at 13; BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 626-27 (discussing
disputed authorities regarding acquired rights to concessions).
19 Thankfully this question has been addressed. See Buchheit et al., supra note 1,
at 34-36.
20 A summary of the ILC's work and links to its various reports as well as
summary records of its meetings is available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/3-3.htm
(last visited May 7, 2007).
21 The proceedings are examined in detail in Part IV.B.1 below.
22 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra
note 7.
23 These are defined in article 2(1)(e) as a "dependent territory," which has a rather
fixed meaning in international law and would likely exclude modem cases of secession
and separation such as in the Balkans, Eritrea, East Timor, and possibly Namibia. See id.
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peoples to sovereignty over their natural resources and shall
not disturb the economic equilibria of the country;
" Uniting of states (article 39): debts of predecessors pass to
successor;
" Separation of part or parts of states (e.g. secession) (article
40): absent agreement, debts pass in equitable proportions;
and
* Dissolution of a state (article 41): absent agreement, debts
pass in equitable proportions.
The Convention has not received enough ratifications to enter into
force, and it has been regarded as "an example of the less
successful codification efforts undertaken within the United
Nations. 24
In any case, the Restatement on Foreign Relations law
announces a somewhat similar position.25 But given what was
noted above by the authors and courts of various jurisdictions, the
failure to adopt the Convention suggests in no way that its rules
were too permissive. And whatever the refusal of states to ratify,
it is interesting that in none of the cases apart from unification of
states is there an automatic passing of the debt. The amounts
determined in other cases are "in equitable proportions." The
Convention does not define equitable proportions, but it is roughly
the familiar idea in state succession law that the benefits of
succession in respect of property and other rights should not pass
without the burdens of the debts and other liabilities.26 It is the
type of test applied, or attempted, in the most recent waves of state
24 Martii Koskenniemi, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English
Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in CODIFICATION: STATE
SUCCESSION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS 118 (The Hague: Hague Academy of
International Law, 1996); see also 0. Schachter, State Succession: The Once and Future
Law, 33 VA J. INT'L L. 253, 258-60 (1993) (considering it a failed attempt at
codification).
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 209 (1987). This section
states a rule similar but narrower than the Vienna Convention. See id. It claims that
debts do not pass unless they are local debts in cases of cession and secession. See id.
The sole exception where debts do pass is absorption of another state, as with the Vienna
Convention. See id.
26 For references to a range of early literature on this concept, see H.J. Cahn, The
Responsibility of the Successor State for War Debt, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 478 (1950);
Williams & Harris, supra note 9, at 365-66; ILA Final Report, supra note 9, at 4. For a
critique, see FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 821.
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succession in the republics seceding from the USSR, the
annexation of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.27 Whether odious debts pass in such an
equitable determination remains an open question for some, but
for most who have examined the question against the backdrop of
recent state practice, it is settled that odious debts are not
apportioned unless by agreement.28  While the unanimity of
agreement may be overstated in these treatments, the substantial
uniformity on this point, and non-agreement as to any binding
obligation to repay, suggest that vigorous denials of the existence
of any odious debt doctrine risk betraying a less than subtle
understanding of public international law.29
C. The Rule of Repayment in Government Succession
The legal position of the rule of repayment with regard to
changes of government, as opposed to state sovereignty, is much
more settled in favor of continuity. J.B. Moore found that
"[c]hanges in the government or internal policy of the state do not
27 See Koskenniemi, supra note 24, at 89-90; Williams & Harris, supra note 9, at
355-60; Acquaviva, supra note 9, at 93-94; ILA Final Report, supra note 9, at 4;
Resolution Concerning State Succession in Matters of Property and Debts arts. 9, 11, 22-
29, INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (2001), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/200l van_ 01en.PDF; Cheng, supra note 14, at 138, 292-97.
28 "[T]here is general agreement in practice, confirmed unanimously by
international legal writing, that so-called odious debts (i.e. debts of the State which do
not relate to any interest of the population of the territory, or incurred in pursuit of illegal
aims, like war) are not subject to succession." ILA Final Report, supra note 9, at 2. "In
rare cases, the identifiable debt might even belong to the category of odious debt, for
which the successor state should not be liable." Williams & Harris, supra note 9, at 408.
"The general principle-universally accepted-is that of avoiding the necessity of
payment of these kind of [odious debt] obligations by the successor state, although the
real problem usually lies in ascertaining whether a specific debt falls in this category."
Acquaviva, supra note 9, at 107-08. But cf Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in
International Law: Remarks on Theory and State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 71, 115
(1997) (whose assessment of the situation vis-A-vis the absorption of the German
Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany conflicts with the more
detailed account in the ILA Final Report).
29 Mancina, supra note 1, at 1252 ("The odious debt doctrine is not a part of
international law. It does not exist under any treaties, nor does it exist in state practice,
as no state has explicitly invoked it and prevailed by raising the doctrine as a defense to a
legal obligation to repay its debts.").
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as a rule affect its position in international law[;] though the
government changes, the nation remains, with rights and
obligations unimpaired."3 ° In the leading Tinoco Arbitration case,
William H. Taft as sole arbitrator reaffirmed this position and
found that the unconstitutional means by which Federico Tinoco
came to power in Venezuela in 1917 did not affect his de facto
authority in the country, and therefore his power to contractually
bind the state under international law.3  International legal
opinion, including the opinion of Sack, was and still is practically
unified on this point.32 Yet, in a much less widely acknowledged
aspect of the Tinoco case,33 Taft went on to find that the disputed
transactions were manifestly for personal and not public uses and
were therefore unenforceable.34 Thus the case frequently cited for
the principle of continuing responsibility for debts absent state
succession35 involved a refusal to enforce such a debt because the
Bank failed to show that the funds were for "legitimate
governmental use. 36 Understood properly, the case stands for the
principle that unconstitutional or revolutionary changes of regimes
are not on their own sufficient to invalidate an obligation, and that
the question of the debt's validity, whether on grounds of valid
formation, public policy, or legality, may enter at an entirely
different level. This issue is examined further in Part V.A below.
D. Expediency and the Opinio Juris of the Rule of Repayment
It is often remarked that so many countries have repaid what
30 1 J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1906). See Lehigh Valley
R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 25, at § 208, reporter's note 2.
31 See Great Britain v. Costa Rica (Tinoco Arbitration), 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147,
149-54 (1924).
32 SACK, supra note 13, at 46-47 (citing authority from Grotius, de Vattel, Calvo,
Politis, Fauchille, Wheaton, and Bayard). Contemporary opinion is still fairly united on
this point. See ILA Final Report, supra note 9, at 14.
33 Indeed, the point seemed lost even on James Crawford as he concludes
erroneously that the Tinoco loans were upheld as valid. See James Crawford,
Democracy and the Body of International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
34 Tinoco Arbitration, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 168-69.
35 ILA Final Report, supra note 9, at 14.
36 Tinoco Arbitration, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. at 169.
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would be considered odious debts that this constitutes an instance
of international custom, or state practice, in favor of the rule of
repaying even odious debts.37  Such instances include post-
revolutionary France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Bavaria,
Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Costa Rica, Turkey, and Germany (in
1918), 38 not to mention the long list of countries that have assumed
dictator's debts in the twentieth century. But it must be recalled
that state practice alone is not sufficient to establish the existence
of a rule of customary international law; it must be accompanied
by opinio juris et necessitatis. In outlining the sources of law, the
Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to "general
practice accepted as law., 39 The requirement that something be
accepted as law is explained in the Lotus Case as "being conscious
of a duty,, 40 and in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case as "a
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is
involved" 4' and that "evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it."' 42  One instance where a practice is not accompanied by the
opinio juris is where a country expressly claims to make payment
ex gratia.43 Others include where the conduct is done by courtesy,
for expediency, or out of duress.
Both contemporary and earlier practice of repaying odious and
other debts is often explicable on grounds of expediency.
Malcolm Shaw notes that "successor states may be keen to
establish their international creditworthiness by becoming
involved in a debt allocation arrangement in circumstances where
37 See Mancina, supra note 1, at 1250; Gelpern, supra note 1, at 406.
38 SACK, supra note 13, at 50-52.
39 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents
/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
40 S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 24, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus/.
41 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den v. F.R.G./Neth), 1969 I.C.J. 43 (Feb.
20).
42 Id. at 44. This notion was affirmed in Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) at 109.
43 An example of this is when the United Kingdom annexed Upper Burma and the
Transvaal. See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 379; see also KEITH, supra note 12, at
71; Hoeflich, supra note 12, at 50 (concerning U.S. annexation of Texas).
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in strict international law this may not be necessary."'  Arthur
Berriedale Keith explained that that the German compensation of
residents in Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871
could be explained on grounds of expediency.45 This was also
why the British Government made payments on debts after the
Boer War and in Upper Burma notwithstanding its express
declaration that it was not obliged to pay.46 Mohammed Bedjaoui
distinguishes certain examples of states repaying war debts by
explaining that "[i]t need hardly be pointed out that such solutions
are generally based on considerations of political expediency.,
47
But expediency would be an understatement of the reasons
favoring the repayment of any sovereign debt owed to European
bondholders in the nineteenth century. The European powers
often used military might or direct administration of the local
economy, typically under threat of force, to enforce the payment
of debts. Recent literature describes such measures as
"supersanctions" in the period of 1870-1913, namely, the use of
direct military pressure or direct imposition of foreign political or
financial control.48 Far from being a remote risk, it was estimated
44 SHAW, supra note 8, at 902.
45 See KEITH, supra note 12, at 71.
46
[T]he British Government had every motive to satisfy the creditors because the
annexation of the Transvaal was already causing grave political unrest in South
Africa, and a repudiation of the debentures would have caused much
indignation among the Dutch holders in the Cape Colony and among foreign
bond holders in Holland, an extremely undesirable contingency in view of the
relation of the Transvvaal Boers to the Cape Boers and the Netherlands.
Further, the fact that the question of altering the terms of the debt were
considered is clear proof that His Majesty's Government did not regard
themselves as legally bound. In the case of the annexation of Upper Burma, in
1886, no regular public debt existed, but the Government paid expressly as a
matter of grace claims on account of monies bona fide lent for and expended on
public purposes, all claims being considered strictly on their merits.
KEITH, supra note 12, at 64.
47 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Ninth Report on Succession of States in Respect of
Matters other than Treaties, UN Doc.A/CN.4/301 AND ADD.I (1977), reprinted in
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, pt. 1,
AICN.4/SER.A/I 977/Add. I (Part1), 71, T 154.
48 Kris James Mitchener & Mark D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign
Debt Repayment (NBER Working Paper 11472, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11472.
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that such sanctions were imposed in roughly one third of cases of
sovereign default.49  As Mitchener and Weidenmier note, "all
nations that defaulted on sovereign debt ran the risk of gunboats
blockading their ports or creditor nations seizing fiscal control of
their country .... 50 Britain alone led debt-related military
interventions or direct administration of the local economy in
Mexico (1861), Egypt (1882), Greece (1887), Venezuela (1902),
Serbia (1904), and Guatemala (1913). 5 1 The Mexican incident
occurred after the government of Benito Jurez declared a
moratorium on debt repayments after the conclusion of the
Mexican War of Reform.5 2 This led to military intervention by the
armies of Britain, France, and Spain, and ultimately led to the
imposition of direct re-colonization by France.53 The Venezuelan
affair, which involved shelling Venezuelan cities by British,
German, and Italian boats, was a flagrant violation of the Monroe
Doctrine and led to a diplomatic intervention by the U.S. President
and ultimately to arbitration of the claims.54
The issue was so acute at the time that it led to the formulation
of the Calvo Doctrine in 1868 and the Drago Doctrine in 1902."5
The Calvo Doctrine was the assertion by an Argentinean jurist,
Carlos Calvo, that there was no right in international law for one
state to use military or even diplomatic intervention to collect on
private pecuniary claims against another state. The exercise of
49 See id. at 2.
50 Id.
We find that, conditional on default, the probability that a country would be
'sanctioned' (either via supersanctions or seizures of assets by private creditors)
was greater than 40 percent during the period 1870-1913. Moreover, roughly
two-thirds of these sanctions took the form of gunboat diplomacy or the loss of
fiscal sovereignty by the defaulting country, i.e. supersanctions.
Id.
51 See H.B. SAMUEL, THE FRENCH DEFAULT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS
INVOLVED IN THE DEBT REPUDIATION OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC 101 (1930).
52 See JOHN N. POMEROY, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIME OF PEACE 75
(1886); see also SACK, supra note 13, at 158. For details on these events, see generally
JAN BAZANT, HISTORIA DE LA DEUDA EXTERIOR DE MI XICO 1823-1946, at 84-99 (1968).
53 See POMEROY, supra note 52, at 75; BAZANT, supra note 52, at 89-99.
54 See A.S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, I AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 28-31
(1907) (describing the Drago doctrine and President Roosevelt's acceptance of it).
55 See id. at 27-28.
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such a putative right, he argued, was blatantly at odds with the
accepted grounds for military intervention then used in Europe,
and was rather a direct continuation of unprincipled attitudes
associated with the colonial era.
56
After the Venezuelan affair in December 1902, the
Argentinean foreign minister, Luis M. Drago, sent a note to
Washington in which he set out the narrower claim that came to be
known as the Drago Doctrine.57 The claim was that the issuance
of foreign debt is a sovereign act and that the use of military force
to collect upon it was not justified in international law or the
domestic law of nations such as the United States. 8 Though some
authors found that the doctrine was discredited and rejected by
creditor states,59 other authors and President Theodore Roosevelt
agreed with its validity.6° It was in any event an important
precursor to the Hague Convention (II) Respecting the Limitation
of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts,
signed at the Second Peace Conference in the Hague on October
18, 1907.61 Article 1 of this convention stipulates that no military
force may be used to collect a sovereign debt owed to a private
person, unless the debtor refuses to submit to arbitration or comply
with the award of an arbitrator. Though the option of force
remained, the use of mandatory arbitration made an important
practical difference. For instance, with regard to the Venezuelan
affair, the appointed claims commission ultimately awarded only
approximately seventeen percent of what was claimed against
Venezuela by persons from the United States, Spain, Britain,
Germany, Belgium, and France.62 Most pertinent, the need for
such a convention goes some distance to explaining why so many
56 See id.
57 See id. at 28-29.
58 See id. at 30-31.
59 See SAMUEL, supra note 51, at 101.
60 Hershey, supra note 54, at 43. Hershey mentions that President Roosevelt fully
endorsed the doctrine in 1905. Id. at 30.
61 Hague Convention (II) Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force
for the Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607.
62 Hershey, supra note 54, at 43. This figure was obtained by aggregating the
individual sums reported by Hershey, which amounted to 28,341,253 Venezuelan
Bolivars awarded out of the 171,604,898 claimed.
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countries emerging from colonial and other subjugation chose not
to take a principled stand against foreign creditors at that point in
time.
Military force was not the only element influencing state
practice in favor of repaying debts. In the context of African
decolonization, for instance, Yilma Makonnen explains that the
ipso facto recognition of some colonial debts by some new states
in Eastern Africa does not imply their ipso jure recognition
because "[s]uch positions were voluntarily assumed for political
reasons. '"63 There have been myriad reasons for repayment:
political recognition,' institutional membership,65  fear of
ostracization in capital markets,66 access to military aid, trade
markets, and drawing rights at the International Monetary Fund
and World Bank. Bedjaoui notes that although several South
American republics assumed the debts of Spain upon liberation,
these were based on the assumption that the debt was concluded
on behalf and for the benefit of the colony, and that in any event
"the precedents set by the South American republics were not
followed in subsequent cases. 67
At all times in the history of sovereign debt, there has been a
set of overpowering incentives and threats associated with
payment of sovereign debt to creditors in a position to punish
defaulting sovereigns. The absence of established opinio juris
undermines the argument that the repayment of such debts was
accepted as law by the debt-servicing nations, in cases of both
63 y. MAKKONEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF AFRICA 409-10
(1983).
64 See MOORE, supra note 30, at 355-56 (referring to arguments of the Spanish
Commissioners stating that recognition of the independence of any Latin American state
by Spain was withheld unless they assumed all debts of any kind); see also Bedjaoui,
supra note 47, at 73, 166 (describing how the Spanish American colonies unilaterally
assumed Spain's debts in return for recognition, peace and friendship); FEILCHENFELD,
supra note 11, at 348 (discussing the recently seceded Republic of Panama's declaration
that it would assume a portion of the Republic of Colombia's debt as soon as
independence was recognized).
65 See Williams & Harris, supra note 9, at 383-400 (discussing the pressure of the
multilateral institutions on the former Soviet republics, and in particular on the states
formerly comprised within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
66 See T. Lothian, The Criticism of Third World Debt and the Revision of Legal
Doctrine, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421, 426 (1995); Feibelman, supra note 1, at 733-34.
67 Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 93, 287.
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government and state succession.
III.Definitions of Odious Debt
Since the doctrine has been treated by a number of authors and
invoked in a variety of situations, it is helpful to survey earlier
treatments and restate the doctrine with some analytical precision.
Accordingly, this Part traces the legal history of the doctrine,
reviews the definitions given by three influential legal scholars,
canvasses the accepted types of odious debt, and then sets forth a
contemporary definition of odious debt, one which is drawn
principally from earlier work and accords with contemporary
usage.
A. A Brief Legal History of the Doctrine
As seen above, the law of state succession in respect of debts
was in disarray, at no time more so than near the turn of the
twentieth century, when Britain and the United States had little
time for the more theoretical juristic doctrines of continental
thinkers. Prior to the turn of the century, it was widely accepted
that debts contracted by one state to repel the invading forces of
another would be considered "war debts" and not be repayable by
the conquering state. Given the further erratic state practice
concerning debts repudiated by Mexico in 1867, those relating to
Cuba in 1898, and Prussian colonization debts that the Allies
refused to charge Poland in 1919, it became necessary for writers
to develop a more sophisticated analysis of law in this area.68
In seeking to assert that, contrary to Anglo-American opinion
at the time, there was a rule of repayment, a number of scholars
needed to give an account of the state succession in respect of
public debts that addressed the variances of state practice. In his
work on the subject, Sack borrowed from Gaston Jze's notion of
regime debts.69 While Sack asserted the doctrine as a principle of
law, Feilchenfeld was more cautious and considered it to be a
68 For references to these incidents, see infra Part IV.A.
69 GASTON JZE, COURS DE SCIENCE DES FINANCES ET DE LIGISLATION FINANCILRE
FRANCAISE: DItPENSES PUBLIQUES-THItORIE GINtRALE DU CRtDIT PUBLIC 302-05, 327
(6th ed. 1922); see also GASTON JEZE, LE PARTAGE DES DETYES PUBLIQUES AU CAS DE
DtMEMBREMENT DE TERRITOIRE 8-11 (5th ed. 1921).
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consideration of equity and morality.7 °  In the United States,
Charles Cheney Hyde, the leading American commentator of his
day and highly indebted to both Sack and Feilchenfeld, was
categorical in his view of the necessity of public benefit for public
debts to be apportioned in cases of cession:
[T]erritory, if occupied by human beings, is not, like a mere
chattel, to be subjected to such fiscal or other use as may suit the
convenience or caprice of the existing governmental authority.
On principle the resources of that territory should not be
regarded as capable of complete hypothecation save under
conditions which do not appear to be essentially adverse to the
welfare of the occupants.71
Hyde did not use the term "odious debt," though his criteria were
even more onerous for creditors. However, Hyde's views
pertained only to cases of cession and dissolution of a state,
7 1
where the legal personality of the borrowing state often remains
intact. He took a different view on cases of total absorption.73
Subsequent to these authors, the doctrine was raised on
occasion by international lawyers after the Second World War,
and was discussed briefly in Daniel Patrick O'Connell's leading
study on state succession.74 In 1977 and in the early 1980s, the
doctrine was considered yet again during the drafting of the
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States on matters other
than treaties. Its status remained unresolved for some, though
definitively included for others. After being taken up only
sporadically in the literature of the 1980s7 5-it was raised in
litigation a few times then (see further below)-the doctrine
experienced a revival after the fall of the Apartheid government in
70 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 701, 714.
71 1 C.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES § 126 (1947). Hyde doubtless had the Cuban affair in mind, and the
term 'hypothecate' was used by the Spanish Commissioners in defense of their claim.
MOORE, supra note 30, at 379.
72 See HYDE, supra note 71, at 420.
73 See id. at417.
74 See O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 458.
75 See Hoeflich, supra note 12, at 69-70; Foorman, supra note 12, at 21-25; Gunter
Frankenberg & Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of Developing
Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L.
415,425-34 (1984).
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South Africa when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
recommended cancelling certain odious debts.76 This momentum
was sustained by a number of civil society groups and various
authors arguing or campaigning for debt relief in the 1990s.77 Just
as the doctrine regained academic interest in the new
millennium,78 and in the midst of discussions of debt legitimacy in
the context of Argentina and Nigeria,79 some members of the Bush
administration and certain periodicals called for the application of
the doctrine to Iraq in 2003.80 Interest among academics and
activists alike was thus revived.
B. Earlier Legal Definitions
1. Sack's Definition
Sack was likely the first to posit the existence of a doctrine of
'odious debt' in such terms. He drew on the public finance theory
and international legal work of the French legal scholar Gaston
Jze, who had developed the concept of "regime debts," namely,
"debts contracted in peacetime, but specially for the purpose of
subjugating the liberated territory.' 81 In building upon this, J~ze's
ideas more generally, and state practice with respect to Cuba, the
United States, Poland, and Mexico, Sack introduced a three-part
typology of odious debts. The first was debts odious for the
76 See 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPORT § 2, CH. 5, 28 (1998)
(mentioning the 1976 International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that helped finance the
security state); see id. at 29-42 (describing a case study of Eskom and other
parastatals involved in security operations); see also ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
COUNTRY PROFILE: SOUTH AFRICA 38 (1996-1997) (mentioning that external debt of
South Africa was very low at the time, thus the nation likely had more to risk than to
gain by invoking it).
77 See Adams, supra note 3, at 17.
78 Khalfan et al., supra note 2, at 2-6; J. Hanlon, supra note 1, at 113-14. See
generally Kremer et al., supra note 1, at 1-26 (discussing odious debt and advocating a
new due diligence model to give lenders more certainty, among other things).
79 See Gelpern, supra note 1, at 6-10 (discussing Argentina); LEX RIEFFEL,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NIGERIA'S PARIS CLUB DEBT PROBLEM 5, POL'Y BRIEF NO. 144
(2005).
80 See Gelpern, supra note 1, at 3-6.
81 JtZE, supra note 69, at 327; Bedjaoui, supra note 47 at 67, 122.
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population of the entire state; 82 the second was debts odious to the
population of part of a state; 83 and the third was debts odious to the
new "supreme" power (i.e., war debts). 84 His definition of "debts
odious for the population of an entire state" is generally regarded
as the most comprehensive definition of odious debt:
When a despotic regime contracts a debt, not for the needs or in
the interests of the state, but rather to strengthen itself, to
suppress a popular insurrection, etc., this debt is odious for the
population of the entire state. This debt does not bind the
nation; it is a debt of the regime, a personal debt contracted by
the power that contracted it, and consequently it falls with the
demise of that power. The reason why these "odious" debts
cannot be considered to burden the territory of the state is that
they do not fulfill one of the conditions determining the
regularity of State debts, namely that State debts must be
incurred, and the proceeds used, for the needs and in the
interests of the state.
Odious debts, contracted and utilised, for purposes which, to the
lenders' knowledge, are contrary to the needs and the interests of
the nation, are not binding on it-when it succeeds in
overthrowing the government that contracted them-unless the
debt is within the limits of real advantages that these debts
might have afforded. The lenders have committed a hostile act
against the people, they cannot expect a nation, which has freed
itself of a despotic regime, to assume these odious debts, which
are the personal debts of the ruler. Even if one despotic regime
is overthrown by another, which is as despotic and which does
not follow the will of the people, the odious debts contracted by
the fallen regime remain personal debts and are not binding on
the new regime.85
Sack's definition comprises three elements: absence of consent,
absence of benefit, and creditor awareness of both. He also
expressly included debts that were for manifestly personal
interests of members of government or persons or groups linked to
82 SACK, supra note 13, at 157-58.
83 Id. at 158-65.
84 Id. at 165-82 ("Dettes odieuses pour le nouveau pouvoir supreme. Dettes de
Guerre.")
85 Adams, supra note 3, at 3 (translating SACK, supra note 13, at 157) (translation
slightly modified by the present author) (emphasis in original).
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government, as well as war debts.86 The notion that proceeds for a
state debt must be incurred and spent in the interests of the state is
borrowed from J~ze,87 who argued that "[s]atisfaction of a public
need in civilised nations is an essential element [of valid public
expenses]."8 8 J~ze proposed two reasons: first, that public money
is made available to public servants (agents publics) to fulfill the
mission of satisfying public needs; second, that to do otherwise
would violate the notion of equality in respect of public charges
and expenses, because the majority of debt payments are financed
through public taxation.8 9 This rationale in some ways merely
restates what had at the time been settled constitutional doctrine in
the United States for several years. 90
Sack's articulation of the odious debt doctrine has been
recognized by other legal writers, notably O'Connell, 91
Frankenberg and Kneiper,92 and a number of more recent
treatments.9
2. Feilchenfeld's Definition
Ernst Feilchenfeld used the terms "odious debt" and "imposed
debts" in a number of sections of his book,94 but did not offer an
86 SACK, supra note 13, at 158.
87 Id. at 25-30.
88 Id. at 25-26 (citing G. JEzE, COURS. DEPENSES PUBLIQUES 37 (6 me ed., 1922)
(translation by author)).
89 Id.
90 See infra notes 223-233 and accompanying text.
91 O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 458-461.
92 Frankenberg & Kneiper, supra note 75, at 425-43 1.
93 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 2-3; Gelpern, supra note 1, at 403-404; Buchheit
et al., supra note 1, at 15-18.
94 See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 32. Feilchenfeld referred to "what some
modem writers refer to as 'odious' debts or 'imposed' debts." Id.; see id. at 269 (noting
that in annexations and dismemberments in Europe, particularly the unifications of Italy
and Germany, in no case were "war debts" or "imposed" debts exempt from maintenance
or assumption); see id. at 337-42 (referring to the American arguments concerning the
absence of consent and benefit and the "odious" character of debts, and to "imposed"
debts); see id. at 445-54 (discussing "other odious debts" excluded from the post-World
War I settlement: one is exemption for Bulgaria's "war of aggression"; another is for the
Polish exemption, which he finds that whatever the moral arguments, could not justify a
violation of the law); see id. at 701-14 (considering the population of the debtor state,
including absence of benefit and absence of consent); see id. at 718 (debts contracted to
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analytical definition, nor did he refer to Sack's definition, despite
referring to Sack on other occasions. The term "odious debt"
arises notably in his examination of the American Commissioners'
arguments in the Cuban loans affair. Nonetheless, the index entry
for "odious debts" in Feilchenfeld's work refers the reader to an
elaborate treatment of the notion of absence of consent and
absence of benefit as criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of
debt.95 Feilchenfeld was clear in that particular section that he
intended to set out criteria for evaluating the "justice of a debt
independent of its legality[J" suggesting such considerations may
help shape future legislation.96 He claimed that the inquiry was on
philosophical grounds, and he warned against introducing
"investigations" based on the considerations he offered "so long as
the entire system of law [was] not changed in accordance" with
such ideas.9 But Feilchenfeld's investigation was not simply pure
philosophy, nor devoid of the consideration of state practice:
For practical purposes, an investigation of the just grounds for
the creation of debts may be restricted to those which for
centuries have been regarded as sufficient or necessary in most
systems of positive law of most of the civilized nations. A
survey of these systems shows that the creation of debts is
justified either by the necessity of raising money for public
purposes, by the doctrine that compensation is owed for tortious
acts to injured persons, by consent of the debtor, or by benefits
received by the debtor.98
Feilchenfeld thus acknowledged a general, widespread recognition
of the requirement of legitimate public purposes for public
borrowing. In his consideration, he examined the Cuban case
embarrass the state, uses consent/benefit theory to say the debt should not, on equitable
and not legal grounds, be maintained); see id. at 786 ("if a rule of law were recognized,
war debts and other 'odious' debts would not be subject to exemption; which was not
general before the War, and has not been generally recognized since the War, as the
Central Powers did not approve of the arguments for such exemption advanced by the
Allies."); see id. at 862, referring to debts "for the purpose of suppressing a rebellion"
and mentioning that it is acceptable only in cases of cession, where "somewhat more
elastic principles may be applied than where maintenance of debts is concerned."
95 See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 916.
96 Id. at 701.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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(what he called imposed debts), and a more general examination
of what might constitute absence of benefit. He found problems in
defining both absence of benefit and absence of consent, but
concludes that borrowing for private enrichment of officials is
among the items that can with certainty be identified as
constituting absence of benefit.99  Furthermore, Feilchenfeld
acknowledged but contested the validity of war debts.'00 Other
authors have referred to Feilchenfeld in their own treatments of
odious debts.'
3. Bedjaoui's Definition
It is of particular interest that Mohammed Bedjaoui did not
refer at all to Sack's formulation of the doctrine in his submission
as Special Rapporteur of draft articles on odious debt to the ILC
for consideration in the draft Vienna Convention on the
Succession of States in Respect of Property, Archives, and
Debts. 102 As Bedjaoui's mandate concerned state succession, he
was naturally concerned with defining odious debt in that context,
though he acknowledged that the notion of regime debts was
applied also outside state succession.'0 3 He offered the following
definition in his draft articles:
Article C. Definition of odious debts
For the purposes of the present articles, "odious debts" means:
(a) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to
attaining the objectives contrary to the major interests of the
successor State or of the transferred territory;
(b) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with an aim
99 See id. at 710. The other, absence of benefit, is where money is contracted for
and spent on items where no possible benefit could be derived, such as a flawed foreign
investment. See id.
100 See id. at 719. Cf. Cahn, supra note 26, at 489 (rejecting Feilchenfeld's findings
on this point).
101 See, e.g., Beemelmans, supra note 28, at 115; Hoeflich, supra note 12, at 45;
Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 69, 132 (discussing Feilchenfeld in the context of odious
debt).
102 Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 67-74, TT 115-173. Bedjaoui was the Minister of
Justice of Algeria before serving as the country's Permanent UN Representative. He
later served as a judge of the International Court of Justice from 1982-200 1, and was its
President from 1994-1997.
103 Id. at 68, 124-25.
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and for a purpose not in conformity with international law and,
in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations.'04
This draft article was not adopted, but neither was the doctrine of
odious debt definitively rejected.' °5 Bedjaoui's was the most
ambitious definition of the doctrine. It used the open-ended
standard "contrary to the major interests," consistent with the
usage of some other writers, 10 6 but said nothing about either the
absence of consent or creditor awareness conditions. Paragraph
(a) addressed both war debts and what Bedjaoui called subjugation
debts (roughly similar to Sack's definition), while paragraph (b)
addressed a new category altogether. Debts contracted with an
aim not in conformity with international law would include those
contracted for the prosecution of an illegal war of aggression,
colonization, apartheid, genocide, contrary to the principle of self-
determination, and other instances of internationally unlawful
behavior. '07
Bedjaoui introduced this clause in part to deal with the
situation of where debts were used to finance internationally
unlawful behavior that, despite its unlawfulness, did not prejudice
the interests of the successor state. So if State A borrows to
finance an illegal war against State B, and State C subsequently
annexes or secedes from State A, Bedjaoui suggested that State C
would not be responsible for the illegal war debts of State A.
Bedjaoui pointed to little in the way of legal authority for this
category, and this would be understandable as what he aimed to
proscribe had only recently been regarded as unlawful. Prior to
1945, wars of aggression, apartheid, genocide, and suppression of
self-determination were more the norm than exceptional breaches
of international law. Thus his definition was an attempt,
defensible and appropriate in my view, to further codify the
consequences of UN Charter commitments in the wake of
genocide, and decolonisation at the height of South African
apartheid.
Bedjaoui's definition has been influential, particularly upon
104 Id. at 74, 173.
105 See infra Part IV. B.1 for discussion.
106 See Foorman, supra note 12, at 21 ("against the interests of the local populace").
107 See Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 69-70 133-39.
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P.K. Menon's work on state succession in relation to debts,' °8 and
was used as the working definition in the Iran-U.S. tribunal
case.' °9 I have also employed Bedjaoui's notion of subjugation
debts below.
4. Established Types of Odious Debt
Legal writing and state practice has thus far recognized two
broad species of odious debt: war debts, and what will for the
sake of brevity be called subjugation debts. War debts have
traditionally been defined "as debts arising out of transactions
which helped or are presumed to have helped the defeated country
in waging or preparing war against the successor state or its
allies."" Not all debts relating to war are war debts. Thus Tai
Heng Cheng appears to misapply the concept when he claims that
Germany's refusal to assume Austria's debts upon its annexation
in 1938 was because the debts were regarded as war debts."' That
was neither the argument advanced by Germany-which argued
that covenants restricting the union of Austria with Germany were
against Austria's interests-nor the purpose of the loans." 2
Furthermore, neither could Iraq's debts in 2003 have been
regarded by the United States as war debts, as the United States
was neither the target of the armed attack such loans funded nor
the successor state to Iraq. It is thus important not to conflate war-
108 See P.K. MENON, THE SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT TO TREATIES, STATE
PROPERTY, ARCHIVES, AND DEBTS 157-66 (1991).
109 See infra Part IV.D.
1l0 Cahn, supra note 26, at 477 (stating that Feilchenfeld and Oppenheim continued
to believe that war debts were enforceable); see also Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 70,
("any debt contracted by the predecessor state to sustain its war effort against the
[successor state]"); J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PART I, PEACE 78 (1904)
(recognizing war debts as exceptions to the rule that a successor state is liable for the
obligations of its predecessor); Amos S. Hershey, The Succession of States, 5 Am. J.
INT'L L. 285, 296 (1911); SACK, supra note 13, at 165; FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at
269, 450-53, 719; HYDE, supra note 71, at 442; O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 461
(acknowledging the widespread authority, but did not believe that war debts should
necessarily be regarded as odious).
III T.H. Cheng, Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, (New York Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 06/07, No.14), available at
http://ssr.com/abstract=948704) (forthcoming 2007 in LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.).
112 See King, supra note 2, at 28; see also HYDE, supra note 7 1, at 419 (citing a U.S.
Dep't of State Press Release of Apr. 9, 1938, at 465-66).
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related debts with the species of odious debt known as war debts.
As for the second category, "hostile debts" was the term used
by O'Connell to describe Sack's doctrine, and this term was also
employed by the American Commissioners in the Cuban loans
negotiations. 13  Jze referred to "regime debts," Bedjaoui to
"subjugation debts," and Feilchenfeld, and again the American
Commissioners, to "imposed debts."' 14 I prefer the term used by
Bedjaoui as the most all-encompassing one. These are debts that
are contracted by a state representative without the population's
consent and against its interests, with both these issues to the
creditor's knowledge. However, these various formulations raise
the question of the extent to which the debt must be aggressively
contrary to the population's interests. At one point, Bedjaoui
suggested a very high threshold for the standard: "debts contracted
by a State with a view to attempting to repress an insurrectionary
movement or war of liberation in a territory that it dominates or
seeks to dominate, or to strengthen its economic colonization of
that territory."'' 5 Yet Sack also spoke of the idea of strengthening
a despotic regime, something perhaps less overtly antagonistic but
still within the conceptual rubric of "absence of benefit" that was
of common concern to all, including Hyde and Feilchenfeld. Then
there is the further question of whether bribery or corruption of
public officials can be considered subjugation or hostile debts. I
attempt to clarify some of the problems left by this categorization
by refining the idea of subjugation debts and introducing the idea
of another species of odious debt, to be called fraudulent, illegal,
and corruption debts.' 16
C. Contemporary Usage: The Three Criteria
Various more recent treatments of odious debt have focused on
the three elements inherent in the American Commissioner's
position vis-A-vis the Cuban loans, and in Sack's statement of the
doctrine, namely, that an odious debt must manifest: (1) absence
of the population's consent, (2) absence of benefit to the
population, and (3) the creditor's awareness of these facts. The
113 See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 11-13.
114 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 104; MOORE, supra note 30, at 358.
115 Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 72, 157.
116 See infra Part V.B.
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absence of consent requirement has roots in Sack's concern with
despotic regimes and it was a key aspect of Cuban debt affair."7 It
was examined critically in great detail by Feilchenfeld," 8 who was
categorical in claiming that a finding of an odious debt must
include a finding of lack of consent,' 9 but that it was not limited to
dictatorial regimes. 2 °  Bedjaoui did not articulate such a
requirement, but the very concept of subjugation debts implies a
lack of consent as well.
The absence of benefit is a central aspect to all proposed
definitions. In the various definitions proposed so far, I would
suggest that there are at least four basic issues requiring resolution:
(1) the intensity or the hostility of the harm/lack of benefit; (2)
whether the loan must be non-beneficial in purpose and in effect,
or if either of the two is sufficient in of itself; (3) whether and
when general purpose loans might be deemed non-beneficial; and
(4) how to assess absence of benefit. The question of the intensity
of the harm needed is likely to vary depending on what type of
odious debt is at issue. This will be discussed further below in
Parts V.B and V.C. As for the second issue, my earlier working
paper offered the view that the proceeds of the debt must be non-
beneficial in both purpose and effect.' 2' In that regard, lending for
odious purposes was recoverable to the extent the state actually
benefited. This is an important part of Sack's proposal, and has
been raised as a reason for which the American Commissioners
went beyond the premises of their own argument in the Cuban
loans case. 2 2 It was also part of Sack's critique of the application
of the doctrine to Poland. 123 The tenability of this view appears
117 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 337.
118 Id. at 702-05.
119 Id. at 714.
120 Id. at 704. Among other scenarios, Feilchenfeld considers a representative body
not elected by the application of fair and normal rules.
121 See King, supra note 2, at 43-46.
122 O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 460; FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 339-40.
123 SACK, supra note 13, at 164. Sack felt that since the landowners whose land was
expropriated received compensation, and because the land was cultivated to the general
profit of the country, that the entire sum should not have been found odious. Id. This
reasoning is unsound because it assumes that a foreign subjugating occupier can
somehow reclaim the items gained notwithstanding such occupation. The natural
response will always be that the loss in opportunity, and harm done, vastly exceed any
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now to be highly suspect. 124 Put shortly, courts are slow to offer
restitutionary remedies to parties whose relevant contractual
obligations are voidable for illegality or for being contrary to
public policy. 1
25
As for the third issue, the nub of the problem is whether
lending for "general public purposes" to a despotic regime is
tantamount to lending for odious purposes. This is a complicated
question, but it might not be necessary to resolve it in advance.
Much will depend on the facts known to the creditor before the
lending takes place. There are ample illustrations of how
constructive knowledge and willful blindness in civil claims can
expose the true intentions of colluding parties. But if any safe-
harbor rule would be needed, it is that lending to non-democratic
regimes must be for specific non-odious purposes. 126 The fourth
and final issue is perhaps the most problematic of all: when and
who is to say that a loan is non-beneficial? This issue receives
separate treatment in Part V.C below.
The idea that creditors must be subjectively aware of the loan
is referred to by most authors.'27 The agreement between Sack and
Feilchenfeld may owe in part to their both being continental
thinkers, where juristic opinion was said to have overwhelmingly
supported the presumption that successor states always pay the
debts of their predecessors. 128 Critics of the doctrine have tended
benefit received. Any analogous claim in domestic law would be dismissed without
hesitation.
124 I expressed earlier reservations about it in King, supra note 2, at 15 n.12. I
ultimately argued, however, that there must be absence of benefit in purpose and in fact.
I now reject this position.
125 N. ENONCHONG, ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS 74-78 (1998) ("Borrowing Contracts: A
person who advances money to another under a loan agreement which is illegal cannot
recover his money either in contract or in an action in restitution for money had and
received."); LAW COMM'N (UK), ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY ON
CONTRACTS AND TRUSTS 27-35, Consultation Paper 154 (1999) ("the general rule is that
illegality acts as a defence to a standard restitutionary claim except where the parties are
'not equally at fault' [i.e. non in pari delicto]"); Paulus, supra note 1, at 100; see also
Part IV.C, infra.
126 For more on this, see Part VI, infra.
127 See SACK, supra note 13, at 157; FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 714;
O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 459; Frankenberg & Knieper, supra note 75, at 429-30;
Foorman, supra note 12, at 24-25.
128 Hoeflich, supra note 12, at 65.
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not to focus on the issue of creditor awareness, for good reasons.
Domestic private law, as well as criminal law, provides extensive
examples of establishing awareness of circumstances that amounts
to knowledge, constructive knowledge, or wilful blindness. 2 9 It is
generally a fact-specific exercise. 30 Furthermore, given the fact
that there must be a lack of consent, and especially that the
purpose of the loan must be non-beneficial, it is doubtful that these
first two hurdles will be cleared without also landing well past the
third.
IV. Odious Debt in the Sources of International Law
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is
generally viewed as "a complete statement of the sources of
international law."' 13' It identifies treaties, state practice accepted
as law, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
and, subsidiarily, judicial decisions and writings of highly
qualified publicists. The following pages survey the ways in
which an odious debt doctrine has been recognized, discussed, or
instantiated within these sources. It does not seek to defend each
example. Nor, for that matter, is it meant to suggest that other
examples may not also exist. It is meant rather to summarize the
work done so far and, where helpful, shed light on some details
not sufficiently explored in the secondary literature.
It should be noted at the outset that states have not historically
declared that they are applying the odious debt doctrine by name,
and neither have all the tribunals discussed below dealt with the
issue under that rubric. It is unnecessary in my view that they
have done so in order to speak meaningfully of state practice in
relation to the doctrine. The term odious debt is merely a label
provided by Sack to identify loans allegedly unenforceable by
reason of their conforming to the three conditions of absence of
benefit, consent, and creditor awareness of both. What advocates
seek to establish is that there is authority in the sources of law that
129 See Buchheit et al,, supra note 1, at 29-36, 47-51; King, supra note 2, at 38-39,
46-47; see also NELSON ENONCHONG, DURESS, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND UNCONSCIONABLE
DEALING 373-81 (2006) (dealing with cases where the nature of the transaction puts a
creditor on alert that reasonable steps must be taken).
130 Id.
131 BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 5.
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show that the rule of repayment does not apply to those kinds of
debts, regardless of what terminology one wishes to use.
A. International Custom
The following instances have been defended or identified in
various accounts as examples of state practice where the nations
have refused to recognize a binding obligation to repay odious
debts: the repudiation by various American states of debts
contracted in violation of state law; 132 Mexican repudiation of
various European debts (1867);' 3 the non-apportionment of
Spanish debts relating to the repression of an independence
struggle on the island of Cuba (1898); 1'3 the Soviet repudiation of
Tsarist debts (1918);' the non-apportionment of Prussian debts
relating to the colonisation of Poland (1919);136 the non-
assumption of certain Austrian debts after the annexation of
132 See Baltzer v. State, 104 N.C. 265, 10 S.E. 153, 154 (N.C. 1889) ("It is conceded
that these bonds, and all the state bonds so issued, were unwarranted by the constitution
of this state, and are void."), affd on other grounds in Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161
U.S. 240 (1896); SACK, supra note 13, at 25, 158; King, supra note 2, at 22-24. See
generally REGINALD C. MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND AMERICAN STATE DEBTS
(1935) (giving details of instances when American states repudiated what may be now
characterized as odious debts).
133 See SACK, supra note 13, at 158; see also POMEROY, supra note 52, at 75
(mentioning the scandalously high interest rates used to maintain the usurper in his
place).
134 See MOORE, supra note 30, at 351-85 (presenting the oral arguments of the
Spanish and American Commissioners during negotiations); see also FEILCHENFELD,
supra note 11, at 329-43 (calling the American arguments 'equitable' and not legal, a
position not shared by the other commentators); SACK, supra note 13, at 159; Bedjaoui,
supra note 47, at 72-73; Foorman, supra note 12, at 23.
135 See Hoeflich, supra note 12, at 62 (acknowledging that the Russians would
likely have considered the debt odious); O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing the
Soviet repudiation of rights and obligations connected with exploitation, though not
connecting it formally with the odious debt doctrine); Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 72
(addressing regime debts as an introduction to the review of subjugation debts);
Foorman, supra note 12, at 19-21; James V. Feinerman, Odious Debts: Old and New
(unpublished manuscript available at www.law.georgetown.edu/intemational/
documents/Feinerman.pdf) (quoting official Chinese views that Russia's position was an
instantiation of the doctrine).
136 See O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 460; SACK, supra note 13, at 163-64
(considering that the entirety of the debt was not odious); Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 73,
168; HYDE, supra note 71, at 407 (not calling it "odious debt" but cited as an instance
of the author's own benefit principle).
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Austria by Nazi Germany (1938); 13  a variety of colonial-era
debts, 38 including all that of the thirteen American colonies upon
declaring independence from Britain,'39 as well as more specific
debts relating to Indonesia;' 4 all of China's pre-revolution debts,
some of which were later characterized as odious in litigation
(1952);... debts relating to the French administration of Algeria
(1962); 42 claims by Iran that certain pre-revolutionary debts
funding arms purchases were odious, a claim lost in arbitration
(1996).' 41
All of these claims have been disputed in recent literature and
to deal with each claim would exceed the scope of this article. But
in my view, most cases remain relevant instances of state practice,
though criticisms have prompted me to abandon certain prior
claims. "
B. Treaties and the Vienna Convention
There are a number of treaties that bear on the topic of what
might be called odious debt as defined in Part III above. For
instance, the notion that state representatives are actually agents of
the corporate personality of the state may be reflected in Article 50
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which allows a
state to invoke the corruption of its representative as a justification
137 See J.W. Garner, Questions of State Succession Raised by the German
Annexation of Austria, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 421, 424-26 (1938); Foorman, supra note 12,
at 21-22; Hoeflich, supra note 12, at 63-64; HYDE, supra note 71, at 418-20.
138 Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 93.
139 Id. at 288; FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 54; MOORE, supra note 30, at 392
(discussing American Commissioners rejection of the contrary argument submitted by
Spain).
140 Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 73-74, 169-70; see also infra, note 187.
141 See infra notes 197-199 (the date referred to in the text is taken from the
maturity date of the bonds at issue in the Jackson litigation).
142 Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 99. Bedjaoui was rather familiar with the
independence movement in Algeria. See, e.g., M. BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN
REVOLUTION (1961) (surveying legal aspects of the liberation struggle in Algeria, not
discussion of debts).
143 See infra, notes 191-192.
144 King, supra note 2, at 22 (discussing Texas); see id. at 24 (discussing Chile and
Peru); see id. at 28 (discussing the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
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for invalidating its consent to be bound. 145  Furthermore, the
number of international conventions proscribing the bribery of
public officials has expanded exponentially in recent years. 4 6 If
the ideas of public consent and benefit are highly relevant to the
legality of a public debt in international law, then international
human rights law, as well as the UN Charter and various
resolutions concerning self-determination and economic rights and
duties of states may also be relevant. 147
145 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 50, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 349 ("if the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty has
been procured through the corruption of its representative directly or indirectly by
another negotiating State, the State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its
consent to be bound by the treaty")
146 See, e.g., Organization of American States, The Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724; Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1; Council of Europe: Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505, ETS No. 173; The African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (2004); United
Nations, Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 9-11, 2003, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/58/422.
147 See The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 21 (3), G.A. Res. 217A
(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) ("[tlhe will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic
and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures"); see also American Convention on
Human Rights, art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144; The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (the obligation of State-parties to take steps to realize
progressively the rights set forth in the Covenant to the maximum of available
resources); United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development,
art. 1, Dec. 4, 1986, Resolution 41/128 ("[t]he right to development is an inalienable
human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural[,] and political
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realized"); African Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 22(2), June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) ("[s]tates shall have
the duty, individually and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to
development"); Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination:
Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1976) (stating that the
concept of self-determination is endemic in international law, concerned mostly with the
rights of peoples to be free of foreign domination; yet at its conceptual core is the idea,
expressed by Woodrow Wilson, that people have the right to choose the sovereign under
which they live). For more information, see generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
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These treaties can be related to the doctrine, and are properly
so related, but the initial and most pressing question is whether
any treaty spoke directly to the existence of the doctrine. The
1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
State Property, Archives, and Debts 4 8 is the only international
convention that bears upon the subject of debt repayment with
respect to state succession, though it is naturally silent on the issue
of government succession. As noted above,149 it has not entered
into force and it is not generally regarded as a successful attempt
at codification. Yet its drafting and adoption by the United
Nations is still relevant in this context because it provides a
statement of rules and principles that are of some ongoing
importance and relevance. 5 °
It is also relevant because some commentators and critics,
including my position in the CISDL working paper, erroneously
conclude that the doctrine of odious debt was deliberately
excluded from the Convention.' This claim is false in certain
important respects. While it is true that a proposed draft article on
odious debts was excluded, there is much evidence to suggest that
the doctrine is fully consistent with the final report of the
International Law Commission (ILC) and that the draft
recommended by the ILC was amended in a way regarded at the
time as confirming that odious debts would not be enforceable
under the Convention. To understand this legislative history
properly, it is necessary to examine three distinct phases of the
Convention's drafting history: (1) the report of the Special
Rapporteur, (2) the draft Convention adopted by the ILC, and (3)
the final text of the Convention adopted by the conference of state
representatives.
SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS
(rev. ed., 1996); MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (C. Tomuschat, ed., 1993);
Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka, ed., 1995); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE (1982).
148 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, supra note 8.
149 See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
150 See Williams & Harris, supra note 9, at 416. •
151 Mancina, supra note 1, at 1250; Cheng, supra note 111, at 24-25; King, supra
note 2, at 28-30.
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1. Report of the Special Rapporteur Mohammed
Bedjaoui
Mohammed Bedjaoui was appointed Special Rapporteur to the
ILC to provide analysis and recommendations on various aspects
of state succession to debts, property, and archives. His ninth
report recommended draft articles on odious debt. He presented
and defended such articles orally in two meetings of the ILC in
May 1977, addressing some of the remarks and concerns raised by
various ILC members.' 5 2 He addressed a number of problems with
the proposed draft, such as the vagueness of the terms used,'53 the
intensity of the threshold needed for subjugation,5 4 and the
problem of "inconsistent" state practice. 55  Yet he noted that
"[m]ost members of the Commission had, however, been of the
opinion that [the draft articles] should be included in the draft but
that they should be improved."' 56 The ILC unanimously agreed to
forward Bedjaoui's draft articles to the Drafting Committee.
It is clear-or at least arguably clear-in this discussion,
however, that Bedjaoui felt that the idea of regime debts was
different from that of odious debts, in that the latter was to be
limited to cases of state succession while the former could be
included in either state or government succession.' Thus,
Bedjaoui may have believed that the concept of odious debts
applied to changes of statehood and not to changes of government.
Yet it is difficult to be conclusive on this issue because his
investigations were limited to cases of state succession, and he
remained more equivocal on this point in his actual report.'58
152 See Summary Records of the Twenty-Ninth Session 9 May - 29 July 1977, at 54-
64, reprinted in [1977] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977
(referring to 1425th, 1426th and 1427th Meetings) [hereinafter Summary Records of
1977].
153 See id. at 63, 7 (1427th Meeting).
154 See id. at 55, 38 (1425th Meeting).
155 See id. at 64, 12 (1427th Meeting).
156 Id. at 63, 6 (1427th Meeting).
157 See id. at 62-63, 4 (1427th Meeting); see also id. at 54-55, 33-35 (1425th
Meeting).
158 See Bedjaoui, supra note 47, at 68.
[Vol. XXXII
ODIOUS DEBT: THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE
2. Consideration by the International Law Commission
The ILC took the position that it was unnecessary to adopt the
proposed draft articles. The issue was considered twice. In its
first interim conclusion on the matter, the ILC found that "the
Commission had decided against drafting general provisions on
'odious debts' in the expectation that the rules being drafted would
be sufficiently wide to cover that situation."'5 9 It went on to say
that some objected to this position, hoping that it was quite
important to clarify the point. Some representatives were
disappointed at this conclusion and noted this in their remarks. 160
After the second reading, the Commission made the final
decision to exclude any articles on odious debt from their final
draft. It explained its decision thus:
The Commission, having discussed articles C and D, recognized
the importance of the issues raised in connection with the
question of "odious" debts, but was of the opinion initially that
the rules formulated for each type of succession might well
settle the issues raised by the question and might dispose of the
need to draft general provisions on it. In completing the second
reading of the draft, the Commission confirmed that initial
view.
16 1
Thus the Commission, in somewhat more timid language, repeated
its view that it was unnecessary to address the problem because
the rest of the Convention provided adequately for that situation.
This is something considerably different than rejecting the
doctrine. In reading the rules that were ultimately adopted, with
their focus on equitable apportionment and agreement, the legal
basis for the exclusion of odious debts from the Convention's
protection is rather obvious. The sole exception to this rule,
however, is that of unification of states, namely, either an equal
federation of states or when one state is wholly absorbed by
another. But excluding odious debts even from this seemingly
159 Documents of the Thirty-Third Session (excluding the report of the Commission
to the General Assembly) at 19 ( 135), 22 ( 160), reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B.Int'l
L.Comm'n 1, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part 1).
160 See id. at 20, 136.
161 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 33d Sess.,
reprinted in [1981] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.I
[hereinafter Report of 33d Session].
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absolute rule under the Convention becomes not only tenable, but
almost undeniable when one sees the revisions undertaken at the
next stage of drafting.
3. Conference of Plenipotentiaries
When the ILC forwarded its draft Convention and commentary
to the UN General Assembly, it recommended that it convene a
conference of plenipotentiaries that would discuss the text with a
view to adopting a final version.162 The question of odious debts
arose again when this conference discussed what ultimately
became article 33 of the Vienna Convention. The LLC draft
originally recommended, "Article 31-State Debt: For the purposes
of the articles in the present Part, 'State debt' means any financial
obligation of a State towards another State, an international
organization or any other subject of international law.', 163  This
was ultimately revised during the conference of plenipotentiaries
and the following was adopted:
Article 33-State Debt
For the purposes of the articles in the present Part, "State debt"
means any financial obligation of a predecessor State arising in
conformity with international law towards another State, an
international organization or any other subject of international
law. [emphasis added]
The words added to the final text were the subject of a
controversial amendment proposed by the delegation of Syria.' 1
The original Syrian proposal included (1) a requirement that debts
arise in "good faith" and thus exclude odious debts, and (2) that
financial obligations incurred by a state must be in conformity
with international law, as a "logical extension of the requirement
162 See United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts: Vienna, Mar. 1-Apr. 8, 1983: 2 Official Records:
Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Committee of the Whole, 148,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/16 (1995). The discussions about odious debt took place
principally during three meetings, the summary records of which are produced at 193-
200 (31st Meeting), 200-07 (32d Meeting), and 207-12 (33d Meeting) [hereinafter
Succession of States].
163 Report of 33d Session, supra note 161, at 72.
164 See Succession of States, supra note 162, at 192-93, 82 (Syrian delegate
introducing UN Doc. A/CONF.I 17/C. 1/L.37 in the 30th Meeting).
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of good faith."'' 65  There was no clear line separating the two
concepts in the statement of the Syrian delegate, but there was
widespread objection to the idea of including the concept of good
faith. This objection was in nearly all cases, including that of
Bedjaoui himself, due to the vague and unnecessary character of
the concept, and not due to the idea of odious debt, 66 though a
small number of states also objected to the idea on grounds of
revisiting the odious debt doctrine. 167  By contrast, a majority
favored keeping the reference to debts arising in conformity with
international law. Thus the Syrian delegate bowed to the
majority's desire and excluded the reference to good faith in an
oral amendment, while keeping the reference to conformity
international law. Thus, it passed as amended by a vote of 43-0,
with 20 abstentions.
168
The question thus is, was the phrase "arising in conformity
with international law" meant, on the basis of this travaux
prdparatoires, to exclude odious debts from the protection of the
Convention? The analysis of this work confirms that this is
undoubtedly the view of the member states that supported the
motion. First, it was the interpretation of the expression advanced
by Syria in its admittedly confusing introduction of the
amendment. Second, it was explicitly pointed out as the reason
why the amendment should be carried by a number of other
165 Id. at 193, 182.
166 See id. at 193, 4 (31st Meeting, Bedjaoui); see id. at 195, 16 (31st Meeting,
USSR); see id. at 195, T 19 (3 1st Meeting, GDR expressing some doubts, but ultimately
supporting it); see id. at 195, 23 (31st Meeting, India); see id. at 196, 26 (31st
Meeting, Great Britain); see id. at 196, 31(31st Meeting, Tunisia); see id. at 197, 40
(3 1st Meeting, Switzerland); see id. at 199, 53 (3 1st Meeting, Israel saying it implicitly
and referring to the invalidation of contracts created under conditions of fraud, duress, or
coercion); see id. at 199, 55 (3 1st Meeting, Greece); see id. at 199, 60 (3 1st Meeting,
Brazil); see id. at 200, 66 (31st Meeting, Denmark delegation stating that the
amendment was "vague and imprecise"); see id. at 200, 69 (31 st Meeting, Byelorussian
SSR); see id. at 200, 1 (32d Meeting, U.S.A.); see id. at 201, 5 (32d Meeting, Italy);
see id. at 202, 17 (32d Meeting, Vietnam); see id. at 202, 24 (32d Meeting,
Bulgaria); see id. at 203, 34 (32d Meeting, France); see id. at 204, 41 (32d Meeting,
Egypt); see id. at 204, 46 (32d Meeting, Mozambique).
167 See id. at 196, 33 (31st Meeting, Federal Republic of Germany); see id. at 203,
34 (32d Meeting, France announcing its concern about the reference to international
law bring the doctrine back into the Convention); see id. at 205, T 64 (32d Meeting,
Portugal).
168 See id. at 208, 12 (33d Meeting).
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states.169 And third, it was the vocal reason that the motion was
not supported by a number of abstaining states.17 0 The conclusion
can only be that that the issue was live at the time of voting, and a
large majority voted in favor of carrying the amendment.
C. General Principles of Law
Buchheit, Gulati, and Thompson have sought to illustrate how
the private law of the state of New York may achieve a good deal
of the result sought by advocates of the doctrine of odious debt.' 71
Other attempts have been made to show how general principles of
law would render odious debt unenforceable as a matter of
international law. Two principal approaches are discernible in the
literature thus far. The first is the use of equitable obligations and
defenses. These would include claims relating to the law of unjust
enrichment, abuse of rights, good faith, and the doctrine of
unclean hands. The idea of abuse of rights and good faith has
been used by Frankenberg and Kneiper, with some plausibility, to
169 See id. at 206, 74 (32d Meeting, Republic of Korea: "[T]he inclusion of the
phrase 'in conformity with international law' would significantly improve the text by
excluding odious debts from the scope of the definition. In [the delegate's] view, non-
transferability of odious debts in cases of State succession was a principle of
international law which had already been established."); see id. at 210, 41 (33d
Meeting, "[Algeria] voted in favour of the Syrian amendment because it endorsed the
explanation given by the Syrian representative concerning its scope, including the
exclusion of odious debts from the concept of State debts"); see id. at 195, 19 (31st
Meeting, German Democratic Republic); see id. at 198, 45 (31st Meeting, Morocco);
see id. at 201, 5 (32d Meeting, Iran). Other states were more equivocal but supportive.
See, e.g., id. at 209, 27 (33d Meeting, Indonesia, "improved the [ILC's] text"); id. at
209, 35 (33d Meeting, Tunisia, "improved the [ILC's] text").
170 See Succession of States, supra note 162, at 208, 17 (33d Meeting, describing
how the Federal Republic of Germany said that it abstained from voting in favor of the
Syrian amendment more because of the delegation's explanation of it rather than the
wording); see id. at 208, 19 (33d Meeting, explaining how the U.S. said it abstained
because of the 'drafting monstrosity' created by the superfluous addition of the wording,
but added that it was "sympathetic to some, but not all, of the reasons given for the
submission of the amendment"); see id. at 209, 25 (33d Meeting, describing how the
U.K. "found disturbing the statement made by the Syrian representative in explanation of
the reasons for that amendment"); see id. at 209, 28 (33d Meeting, Pakistan); see id. at
209, 34 (33d Meeting, France); see id. at 210, 37 (33d Meeting, Israel); see id. at 210,
39 (33d Meeting, Australia).
171 See generally Buchheit et al., supra note I (However, there would be no success,
on my understanding of the law they cite, for any claim concerning a subjugation debt
related to state-sponsored oppression).
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suggest that the exercise of a right to reclaim an odious debt would
constitute an abuse of contractual rights. 72 While this approach
has obvious plausibility, it is a somewhat slim bit of law upon
which to base the desired sweeping result. And furthermore, the
precise status of the doctrine of abuse of rights in international law
is not altogether confirmed, 73 though Michael Byers makes a
persuasive case for its existence and precise parameters. 174
The concept of unjust enrichment is the central plank in
O'Connell's theory of state succession. 17  If this is the rationale,
however, then it can become immediately apparent why odious
debts would present a problem. By definition, if there is no
benefit, there is no enrichment for the state, and furthermore, any
putative enrichment would not be unjustified because ex hypothesi
the very purpose of the debt was contrary to the interests of the
population.'76  Whatever the potential of this investigation,
however, it is altogether less clear what application it would have
in cases of government succession unless the contract at issue
were already regarded as void or voidable for illegality. In other
words, it may deny a restitutionary remedy where that is the only
basis for a claim, but probably would not extinguish a valid
contractual claim.
The second principal approach has been to examine the
relevance of the law of agency, which recognizes a fiduciary
obligation on the part of agents to act for the benefit of their
principals. The obvious connection is that state representatives
(including heads of state) act as agents for the state itself, which
includes the population. This type of analysis was first presented,
172 See Frankenberg & Knieper, supra note 75, at 428. "Odious debts are excepted
from the obligation of fulfillment not because they are considered an excessive burden
for the successor, but rather because they are contracted under abuse of rights. The
abuse is constituted in a purpose which contradicts the interest of the attributable subject
[the population] ... ." Id.
173 BROWNL1E supra note 7, at 429-30.
174 M. Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389
(2002).
175 See O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 34.
176 For problems in English law associated with recovery of money or property lost
as part of an illegal transaction or transaction made against public policy, see infra Part
V.C; see also Paulus, supra note 1, at 100 (confirming the same result obtains in the civil
law tradition).
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to my knowledge, in the CISDL working paper. 177 That treatment
was superseded by a more extensive study of American agency
law applicable in the state of New York by Buchheit, Gulati, and
Thompson, 178 and has received further elaboration by agency law
expert Deborah DeMott. 179  Apart from the issue of whether
focusing on New York law is sufficient on its own, or whether a
truly international agency law must be examined, more pressing
problems remain. First, given that most agency law is based
primarily on the notion of consent between principal and agent,
and that consent to be governed is not a mandatory requirement in
international law, can the analogy properly apply?18° Second,
given the peculiar constitutional arrangements between public
officials and the state, is it appropriate to recognize a fiduciary
obligation between head of state and population?'81 Third, is all
this talk of New York law and fiduciary obligations a bit parochial
for a claim about a general principle of law that must necessarily
sound in more than one legal tradition? Finally, even if all the
above concerns were met, precisely what would a fiduciary-like
obligation between state representative and state proscribe?
Would it cover bribery only? Or would subjugation be included
too? The former fits nicely with the clear stand taken in domestic
law, but the latter is an issue it has never confronted. None of
these issues are in my view insurmountable, but they are, sadly,
beyond what can be addressed here.
D. Writings and Judicial Decisions
The legal writing on this topic until now could be classified as
those who assert the existence of the doctrine in the international
law of state succession;'82 those who assert its existence in cases of
177 King, supra note 2, at 36-39.
178 See Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 36-44.
179 Deborah A. DeMott, Agency by Analogy: A Comment on Odious Debt, 70 J.L. &
CONTEM. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).
180 See id. (raising this issue); see also King, supra note 2, at 37-38 (addressing this
issue), and I will shortly issue a stronger defense of this position, supra note 4.
181 Of two papers on this topic, see E. Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State
Legal Authority, 31 Queen's L.J. 259 (2005), and Jedediah Purdy & Kimberly Fielding,
Sovereigns, Trustees, Guardians: Private-Law Concepts and the Limits of Legitimate
State Power, 70 J.L. & CONTEM. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).
182 For details, see generally SACK, supra note 13; HYDE, supra note 71 (in cases of
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government succession; 18 those who acknowledge its existence in
the law of state succession but express reservations as to its
application; 18 and those who have denied it as a matter of positive
international law.185  Clearly one cannot assess the doctrine's
validity by placing the various texts on the scales and seeing how
they tilt. While there is no consensus as to its present status, it
appears that the majority of scholarly opinion is against the idea
that the doctrine pertains to cases of government succession.'86
The judicial decisions relating to the existence of a doctrine
have been equally inconclusive. There have been at least three
cases that have dealt with the doctrine in name. In Poldermans v
State of the Netherlands,187 a Dutch national employed in the
Netherlands Indies administration claimed lost salary relating to a
period of internment he suffered under the Japanese occupation of
Dutch controlled Indonesia. The Supreme Court of the Hague
upheld the denial of his claim on the grounds that the
responsibility for the debt passed to Indonesia under a settlement
treaty. 118 Poldermans argued, inter alia, that the debt would be
regarded as odious by Indonesia. 189 The tribunal took a neutral
stand on the existence of the doctrine, and found it had no
application to that case.' 9° The second case in which it arose was
during the mixed arbitrations taking place between Iran and the
United States.' 9' Although there were many claims made over the
cession); Bedjaoui, supra note 47; MENON, supra note 108; Acquaviva, supra note 9; the
ILA Final Report, supra note 9; Williams & Harris, supra note 9; and King, supra note
2.
183 See SACK, supra note 13, at 46; King, supra note 2, at 47.
184 PHILIP R. WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: PROJECT
FINANCE, SUBORDINATED DEBT AND STATE LOANS 168 (1995).
185 See Beemelmans, supra note 28, at 115; Paulus, supra note 1, at 91; Gelper,
supra note 1, at 406.
186 This is a view I will challenge more directly in the forthcoming Restatement,
supra note 4.
187 24 I.L.R. 69 (Sup. Ct. of the Hague 1956).
188 Id. at 72.
189 Id.
190 Id. I would thank Dr. Vanessa Mak for confirming that the tone of the Dutch-
language judgment is accurately described as neutral.
191 See generally, C.N. BROWER & J. D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998).
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course of several years, the issue of odious debt rarely arose, and
was addressed by a majority of panel members only once in the
reported decisions. In United States of America v Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iran contested the enforceability of a 1948
contract for the supply of military and other equipment to Iran. 192
The Tribunal declared that it would take no stand on the doctrinal
debate concerning the existence of a "doctrine of odious debts in
international law." '193 But it added that if such a doctrine did exist,
it did so only in cases of state and not government succession. 194 It
found further that Iran was a case of government succession, but
even if it was a case of state succession, that the loans at issue
were not non-beneficial because they were contracted in times of
peace and were thus meant to serve the role of protecting the
country from external aggression. 95
Another claim arose in the context of complicated litigation
involving suit in U.S. federal courts by holders of railway bonds
issued by imperial China but ultimately repudiated by the People's
Republic of China (PRC). 196  At first instance, a district court
judge entered default judgment against China, 97 precipitating a
diplomatic row, and eventually a successful application to have the
judgment vacated. China then filed successfully, in a third case, a
motion to have the suit dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.198 This was appealed by the bondholders to the Court
of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit, and the U.S. government
intervened in support of China. 99 In his representations, the U.S.
Attorney General explained that China viewed the debts as part of
the Western powers' domination of China at that time, and that
192 United States of America v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 32 Iran-US C1. Trib. Rep.
162 (1996) (Chamber Two Award No. 574-B36-2 of 3 Dec. 1996) [hereinafter Iran
Tribunal].
193 Id. at T 54.
194 Id.
195 A critique of this case may be found in Restatement, supra note 4.
196 The best general account of the litigation and historical backdrop is Feinerman,
supra note 135.
197 See Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F.Supp 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
198 See Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 596 F.Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
199 Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied, 801 F.2d 404 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
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"the PRC maintains that under the principle of non-liability for
'odious debts' China bears no responsibility for the bonds. '200 The
court upheld the district court judge's finding on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and gave no opinion on the validity of the
odious debt claim. The bondholders remained unpaid.
Apart from these three inconclusive cases, the most well
known leading case relating to odious debts is the Tinoco
Arbitration.20 ' This case involved the use by the Costa Rican
president of a revolving credit facility with the Royal Bank of
Canada for himself and his brother at a time when the demise of
his government was imminent and known to the bank to be so.
The arbitrator, Chief Justice Taft of the U.S. Supreme Court,
found that
[t]he case of the Royal Bank depends not on the mere form of
the transaction but on the good faith of the bank in the payment
of money for the real use of the Costa Rican Government under
the Tinoco r6gime. It must make out its case of actual
furnishing of money to the government for its legitimate use. It
has not done so.
202
It is notable that the case involved debts related to personal
enrichment, that it involved government and not state succession,
and that the label "odious debt" was not used in the case. Much
more recently, it was found by a panel of ICSID arbitrators in a
case against Kenya that bribery of public officials is contrary to
international public policy and that contracts procured thereby are
voidable as against such a policy.0 3 The two cases are connected
by a common thread: both involved debts used for personal
enrichment. Yet in the latter case, the contract was voidable for its
illegality, and no restitutionary remedies were sought.
2°4
Anna Gelpern has noted that no tribunal has ever cited the
odious debt doctrine as a reason for invalidating a sovereign
200 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495.
201 Tinoco Arbitration, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147.
202 Id. at 168.
203 World Duty Free Co. Ltd v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/00/7 Award, $T 140-153 (2006).
204 Id. at T 179. There was a restitutionary remedy available in Tinoco Arbitration,
18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147.
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debt.2"5 This is a characteristically accurate statement of law, but
it proves far less than what those who cite it appear to believe. For
one thing, neither has a tribunal definitively rejected the doctrine.
But additionally, and much more importantly, the fact is that
international law is composed chiefly of customary law and
treaties. Bringing sovereign states before domestic courts has
been a relatively recent phenomenon due to the previously
widespread acceptance of the doctrine of "absolute" sovereign
immunity.20 6 Thus, the failure of a court to recognize the doctrine
is not surprising. Indeed, Article 38(l)(d) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice makes clear that judicial decisions
are a "subsidiary means" for the determination of rules of law.20 7
Thus while relevant, the absence of judicial endorsement should
not be clothed with the significance common law lawyers attribute
to the absence of judicial precedent in domestic law.
V. Enduring Issues
A. State or Government Succession?
A central issue in the current debate is what the status of the
doctrine is in cases of government succession. Some authorities
insist that the doctrine, if it applies at all, does so only in cases of
state succession.20 8 The distinction between state and government
succession can seem tenuous at times of radical internal upheaval
such as the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian revolutions. This may
be true, but more important is the observation, made by Ernst
Feilchenfeld and others, that acknowledging the relevance of
odious debt in cases of state succession but denying it in cases of
governmental succession seems entirely arbitrary:
If the opinion prevails that certain burdens should not fall upon
the population of a debtor state, protection should be given, even
if there has been neither annexation nor dismemberment; for
unless such protection is generally admitted, it is illogical to
advocate it in the case of state succession, which in itself affords
205 Gelpern, supra note 1, at 406.
206 Buchheit et al., supra note 1, at 55-57.
207 Statute of International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060.
208 Iran Tribunal, 32 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. at T 54.
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no reason why the burdens of the population of a debtor state
should be alleviated. °9
Of the various cases that have been asserted as odious in the
context of government succession, there have been the debts in the
various American states in the nineteenth century (ones that were
part of the Confederacy), one instance in Mexico, and the cases of
Russia, China, the Tinoco loans, and the recent Kenya contract
that was voided for its illegality. 210 Though the debate is still quite
live and the dust has not settled, it seems that concept of
illegitimacy or odiousness may have played a role in the recent
debt write-downs pertaining to Argentina, Iraq, and Nigeria.211
There is admittedly less evidence for the existence of the
doctrine in cases involving government succession. Yet given (1)
the fundamental overhaul in the international legal framework
regarding international human rights, the right to self-
determination, and arguments in favor of a right to democratic
governance in international law; (2) consensus on the illegality of
bribery; (3) the existence of some historical precedents; (4) the
weak evidence of opinio juris regarding the rule of repayment; and
(5) recent write-downs where notions of debt legitimacy appear to
play a role, it is possible to argue that an odious debt exception to
the rule of repayment in government successions is in statu
nascendi. This argument needs further development, but creditors
209 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 11, at 716; see also Gelpern, supra note 1, at 411
(stating that the focus on state as opposed to government succession in the doctrine
seems artificial); Paulus, supra note 1, at 93 ("[t]he debt per se is odious; it does not
merely become odious because of any change in the actors involved.").
210 For a discussion of these cases see supra Parts IV.A, D.
211 The facts pertaining to the Iraqi and Argentinean cases are well set out in
Gelpern, supra note I. Gelpem argues that whatever the merit of legitimacy arguments,
they were not the reasons officially given by the Argentinean government and U.S.-
appointed Iraqi negotiators in their successful bids for the substantial write-downs. Id. at
402-03, 409-11. For information regarding the Paris Club write-down of Nigerian debt
by about 60 percent, see Lydia Polgreen, Nigeria Finalizes Plans to Pay Off$30 Billion
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at A8. Further research will shortly be forthcoming on
this issue, including by Justin Alexander, Iraq and the Odious Debt Doctrine
(unpublished draft on file with author) (surveying the influence of the doctrine on Iraqi
society, the U.S. administration, and as a key backdrop to the Paris Club agreement) and
by Jai Damle, Note, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming Fall 2007) (arguing that the doctrine may well have influenced the
outcomes in both Iraq and Nigeria, though such influence fell fall short of an application
of the traditional doctrine).
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should be wary of such an outcome.
B. The Need to Recognize Types of Odious Debt
A little-acknowledged problem in the discussion of odious
debts is the varied nature of the debts that are called odious. War
debts are considered odious, but there is no observance of the three
criteria of absence of consent, absence of benefit, and creditor
awareness. This has led quite naturally, for example, to Buchheit,
Gulati, and Thompson considering war debts to be different than
odious debts, whereas historically war debts have been considered
a species of odious debts. More importantly, what happened in
Cuba and Poland is unlike what took place in the southern
American states, Costa Rica, and Kenya. In the latter cases, there
was flagrant corruption or bribery, whereas in the former cases,
there was colonial subjugation. And neither the judges nor the
parties in the latter cases called the debts "odious." These
differences may muddy the waters in one way, but in another, they
point to the need for a distinction that can bring a great deal of
clarity to the debate.
In a review of state practice and examination of recent cases
where state succession has occurred without the assumption of any
debts whatsoever, it has become apparent to me that there is a
need for a typology of four types of odious debts: war debts,
subjugation debts, illegal occupation debts, and fraudulent, illegal,
or corruption debts. War debts are sui generis, as they have
nothing to do with the consent or benefit of the population, but
history has deemed them odious debts, as they are odious to what
Sack called the "new supreme power" and what Bedjaoui referred
to less colorfully as the successor state.2"2 But furthermore, there
are reasons for believing that certain types of war debts that do not
relate to the subjection of a given population still ought not be
enforced against them. I have in mind those funding, for example,
illegal wars such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. This
corresponds with the second paragraph of Bedjaoui's proposed
formulation of odious debt.21 3
Subjugation debts would presently include those whose
purpose is known to the creditor to assist the subjection of the
212 See supra Part III.B.1, B.3.
213 See supra Part 1II.B.3.
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population of a state by a despotic leader, the repression of an
independence movement, or the economic or political colonization
of a territory. There is some degree of uncertainty in this category,
especially in the concept of a "despotic leader." It will be helpful,
then, to use established concepts in international law that set both
a high threshold and one for which there is an international
practice in identifying and recognizing. Three highly relevant
standards, reflecting the gravity and consensus needed, would
include those regimes committing genocide, international crimes,
or gross and systematic violations of human rights."1 4
A third category, not previously identified, is illegal
occupation debts. There is evidence in recent state practice in
post-World War II Croatia,215 the post-Soviet Baltic republics,
216
the South African forgiveness of apartheid-era Namibian debt,
217
214 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF
CRIMES 2-13 (2000). For more information on the aspects and relevant international
legal standards of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other international
crimes, see generally KRIANGSAK KIT-rICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2001). The idea of "gross violations of human rights" is derived from Economic and
Social Council Resolution 1235 (XLII), 42 UN ESCOR Supp (No 1) at 17, UN Doc
E/4393 (1967), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/procedures/1235.htm
(article 2, concerning "gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms"), and
Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVII), 48 U.N.
ESCOR (No. ]A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/procedures/1235.html (article 1, concerning "a
consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights"), both of
which empower the former Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights
Council) to consider communications pertaining to such gross violations. The 1503
procedure is confidential and has been the subject of trenchant criticism. This criticism
and a survey of the advantages and drawbacks can be found in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 151-63 (Philip Alston, ed., 1992) (describing the
1503 procedure and addressing the selection of countries and rapporteurs under the 1235
procedure). For more recent treatment, see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS AND MORALS (2d ed. 2000).
215 Postal Administration of Portugal v Postal Administration of Yugoslavia, 23
I.L.R. 591 (1956).
216 See Williams & Harris, supra note 9, at 366, 370; see also L. Love, International
Agreement Obligations after the Soviet Union's Break-Up: Current United States
Practise and its Consistency with International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 373,
398, 402-03 (1993).
217 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: NAMIBIA, SWAZILAND,
THIRD QUARTER 20 (1995).
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as well as Eritrea's secession without debt from Ethiopia,218 and
East Timor's (now Timor Leste) debt-free independence from
Indonesia.219 In each case, the republics emerged debt free. The
presumption has tended to be that foreign occupation can bring no
benefits unless benefits are specifically proved. The existence of a
legal framework on illegality, and the presumption of non-benefit,
helps keep this category relatively clean and discrete.
The fourth category is fraudulent, illegal, or corruption debts.
Such debts have certain features that make them more palatable to
critics of the odious debt doctrine. The failure to segregate them
has caused us on occasion to conflate them with subjugation debts,
which involve a substantive evaluation of a sovereign's policy
towards its people. Fraudulent, illegal, or corruption debts can be
identified with widely accepted principles of law, with domestic
law of the borrowing state (especially constitutional law), and with
the law of the chosen jurisdiction. There is typically little doubt
about whether a sum paid in bribery was beneficial or not. And
furthermore, it is now settled in World Duty Free v Kenya, as well
as in the Tinoco Arbitration, that such debts are as unenforceable
in cases of government succession as they are in state
succession.22 °
Employing this typology will help the debate proceed and
ensure that those who object to an assessment of regime
legitimacy are not countered with examples of corruption. I
suspect that the real issue in the debate going forward will concern
the enforceability of subjugation debts, and whether any exception
concerning these debts should be recognized in the rule of
repayment in government succession.
218 On Eritrean independence, see generally R. IYOB, THE ERITREAN STRUGGLE FOR
INDEPENDENCE: DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, NATIONALISM 1941-1993 (1995). For
confirmation that Eritrea emerged debt-free, see ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
COUNTRY PROFILE: ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, SOMALIA AND DIIBOUTI 47 (1993-1994).
219 For details on East Timor's independence movement, see generally MICHAEL
G.SMITH & MOREEN DEE, PEACE KEEPING IN EAST TIMOR: THE PATH TO INDEPENDENCE
(2003). The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2004 Country Report for East Timor makes
no mention of any East Timorese debt. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY
PROFILE: EAST TIMOR 24 (2004)
220 See World Free Duty Co, Case No. ARB/oo Award, 156, 169; Tinoco
Arbitration, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 168-69.
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C. The Problem of Assessing Benefit
A common criticism of the doctrine is of the difficulty of
defining "absence of benefit., 221 The first issue is who will define
it; the second is how. The former is easy to answer. Sack
advocated an impartial tribunal, and there are ample precedents
and settled rules for establishing them.222 But that answer simply
begs the question of what standard such a body would use. That
ultimately is the real concern of those who raise the objection.
The idea of "benefit" is vague. My earlier attempt to shed
light on this issue has been criticized. 223  But the law is rife with
judicial interpretation of vague terms. 224  Examples include the
concept of reasonableness in tort law, the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review in American administrative law, the rationality
standard in English administrative law,225  and statutory
interpretation of vague terms as well as constitutional
interpretation of terms such as "cruel and unusual punishment,"
221 Kremer et al., supra note 1, at 17 (criticizing the idea of assessing "consent,"
something much easier); see also Paulus, supra note I, at 94; Jack Boorman, Special
Advisor to the IMF, Address to the IMF: Who Decides Which Debt Falls into these
Categories? What are the Values or Criteria to be Applied? (2003), http://www.
imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/043003.htm.
222 King, supra note 2, at 17. I have outlined an approach for the case of Iraq in J.
King, Preliminary Structural and Procedural Aspects of Iraq Tribunal,
http://www.jubileeiraq.org/tribunal.htm (last visited May 7, 2007). This is not meant to
gloss over the inherent difficulties involved in asserting odiousness. Ultimately, the
issue must be resolved by examining whether repudiation, arbitration, or litigation is
appropriate, and by examining comparative and international approaches to public policy
and the enforceability of exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction selection clauses, as
well as public international law concerns of sovereignty. For reflections on this process,
see Ashfaq Khalfan, Sites and Strategic Legal Options for Addressing Illegitimate Debt,
in Khalfan et al., supra note 2, at 53, 68-70.
223 See Kremer et al., supra note 1, at 17. The careful arguments presented there
cannot be addressed properly here, but it is accepted that classifying governments into
dictatorial, quasi-dictatorial, democratic, and quasi-democratic categories is problematic.
However, the indicia I provide are not as unworkable as the critique suggests.
Regardless, in work presently underway, I no longer adopt this analysis and so the point
is now moot.
224 For more information, see generally T.A.O. ENDICOT, VAGUENESS IN LAW
(2001).
225 See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 351-413
(9th ed. 2004); Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985]
A.C. 374, 410-11 (H.L.) (stating the classic grounds for review in administrative law).
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"equal protection of laws[,]" or "necessary in the interests of a
democratic society. ' 22 6  These are hardly peripheral concepts in
law. Kremer, Jayachandran, and Shafter argue that international
adjudication deals less appropriately with vague concepts due the
lack of customary practice and guiding standards.227 But this
argument is not particularly convincing. On the one hand, the
same charge has frequently been laid at the feet of domestic
judges, whose baby steps on many such issues are also a matter of
first impression. On the other hand, international tribunals are free
to draw from a much wider range of national sources than
domestic judges themselves. The case law of the European Court
of Human Rights, European Court of Justice,228 and a number of
others provide ample illustrations of this point. And in any event,
there is no reason to think an international tribunal would not use
local law and custom in connection with international law to
determine the outcome.
Furthermore, it is also the case that the notions of "public
226 For some examples, see The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 222; see also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act,
1982, Part I (Can.), enacted as Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § I (U.K.)
(allowing limitations of rights if prescribed by law and 'demonstrably justifiable in a free
and democratic society'); R. v. Oakes, [1986]1 S.C.R. 103, 135-42 (holding that
provisions of the Narcotic Control Act violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
were not justified as reasonable or "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society").
227 Kremer et al., supra note 1, at 18.
228 For one of numerous examples, see Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (search by application number)
(reviewing the legal arrangements concerning the wearing of headscarves in schools of
several European countries); see also, e.g., Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n
v. Comm'n, 2 E.C.R. 1063 (1974), 15 ("the general [administrative law] rule [of
several member states is] that a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a
decision taken by a public authority, must be given the opportunity to make his point of
view known"); Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 2 E.C.R. 3727 (1979), 15
("fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the law ... in
safeguarding those rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, so that measures which are incompatible with
the fundamental rights recognized by the Constitutions of those States are unacceptable
in the Community and that, similarly, international treaties for the protection of human
fights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories,
can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community
law").
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purpose" and "public benefit" already play a role in public law and
courts engage in review of them. American public law, for
instance, has recognized that the raising of taxes must be for
public purposes, and that by extension, any public debt that will be
financed out of public tax money must itself be for public
purposes.29 The requirement of public purpose has been litigated
in various states. The issue arose in particular in municipal
financing of industrial development. 230  According to one judge,
over thirty issues of industrial project revenue bonds (a sub-
category of industrial project bonds) were challenged in courts and
found to be valid, though five were not.231  As elaborated in the
case law, the public purpose was often synonymous with public
benefit,232 and several items have been sanctioned as being in the
public benefit. So, care of the poor, relief of unemployment,
promotion of agriculture and industry,233 establishment of a state
school, a gristmill for public use, and establishment of railroads
were all identified long ago by the Supreme Court as public
234purposes.
The meaning of public purpose is also the center of
considerable litigation under takings and eminent domain
229 See, e.g., Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920) (regarding taxes); Cole
v. City of La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1885) (finding that bonds issued to a private
company, formed strictly for private gain and having no public purpose, would not be for
a public purpose).
230 See Note, Incentives to Industrial Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Board
Plans, 66 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1953); Note, The 'Public Purpose' of Municipal
Financing for Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789 (1960-61).
231 See Potter v. Judge, 444 N.E.2d 821, 824 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting People ex
rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 291 N.E.2d 807, 813 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1972)).
232 Id.; see also Incentives to Industrial Relocation, supra note 230, at 903 ("the
only valid criterion would seem to be whether the expenditures are sufficiently beneficial
to the community as a whole to justify governmental involvement"). The Note continues
to question the validity of this approach, suggesting a highly deferential approach. Id.;
The 'Public Purpose', supra note 230, at 796 (providing greater detail on what courts
should consider to be public purpose).
233 Each cited in The 'Public Purpose', supra note 230, at 795.
234 As summarized in Cole, 113 U.S. at 6-8. The claims must be contextual.
Railroads for transporting victims in a genocide will not be beneficial, and those in the
Chinese case concerning the Hukuang railroad bonds were equally regarded as odious
for the People's Republic of China. See supra notes 196-199 and accompanying text.
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litigation in the United States.235  The standard has remained
highly deferential, however.236 The basic concern in cases of both
public debt and takings is to prevent wealth transfers by public
bodies from one individual to another-naked expropriations in
other words. 2 37  But since land is taken or debt is issued often in
conjunction with a private enterprise initiative, but nominally in
the interest of the state, many often doubt the benefit to the
community. Courts have been reluctant to substitute their own
opinions of what constitutes public benefit in such cases, as doing
so is reminiscent of Lochner-era judicial attitudes towards New
Deal-type social welfare initiatives.238 Where the aim is legitimate
and the means are rationally related to the ends, therefore, the
courts will defer to the judgment of the legislature.239
Thus as much as the litigation serves as an example of judicial
review of public purpose, it suggests that one can expect
considerable judicial deference as to what constitutes public
benefit. However, the reason for deference in most cases was
chiefly because of the democratically accountable nature of the
primary decision-maker. 240  This rationale thus applies less
forcefully when dealing with a dictatorial regime. One firm lesson
235 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 465 U.S. 229 (1984). For a pro-property rights view, see generally
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
For a more restrictive view, see generally Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077
(1993). See generally J. RYSKAMP, THE EMINENT DOMAIN REVOLT: CHANGING
PERCEPTIONS IN A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL EPOCH (2006) (discussing the current debate
raging about whether takings of property that are then used to confer benefits on private
businesses under the rationale of economic development are a legitimate invocation of
"'public purpose," notwithstanding the Supreme Court's apparent endorsement of the
practice in Kelo, 545 U.S. 469).
236 Midkiff, 465 U.S. at 240. "There is, of course a role for courts to play in
reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the
eminent domain power is equated with police power. But the Court in Berman made
clear that it is 'an extremely narrow' one .... " Id.
237 Id. at 244 ("[a] purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the
public use requirement").
238 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(1987) (discussing the effect of Lochner on the decisions and analyses of subsequent
constitutional courts).
239 Midkiff, 465 U.S. at 242; Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488.
240 See generally Midkiff, 465 U.S. 229; Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
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from the American takings law is that it appears possible to ensure
that borrowing is for public purposes by essentially procedural
means. One way is to require that borrowing be undertaken
pursuant to an integrated development plan. This was an essential
element of the finding of public purpose in Kelo, and it was
suggested in the case that purposes arrived at outside such a
deliberative process would be subjected to much greater
scrutiny.24 1 I employ this same idea in Part VI below.
The idea of a public purpose requirement is a familiar concept
in trusts law. Charitable trusts, to obtain their special status, must
be for the public benefit in English law.242 Until the introduction
of the Charities Act 2006, it was assumed under the English
common law of trusts that certain gifts, such as those for the
advancement of religion and education, or the relief of poverty,
were presumptively for the public benefit.2 43 Now section three
has removed that presumption and public benefit must be proved
under a public benefit test. Thus section 3 actually expands the
potential for litigation over what constitutes public benefit, and
this after a sweeping consultation. The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts acknowledges a position analogous to the pre-2006 English
common law.244
A further and perhaps more powerful problem for this
objection may be found in public international law itself. It is
clear that the entire notion of "equitable proportions" in state
succession law is linked intrinsically with the notion of benefits
and burdens. 245 Similarly, Charles Cheney Hyde, perhaps still one
of America's most revered scholars of public international law,
advocated the position that in some cases the success of a
creditor's claim should depend on the "proof of benefits" received
241 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486-87.
242 JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY AND MARTIN ON MODERN EQUITY 432 (17th ed. 2005).
For an early look at the problem, see generally Patrick S. Atiyah, Public Benefit in
Charities, 21 MOD. L. REV. 138 (1958).
243 MARTIN, supra note 242, at 432-34. For discussion of public benefit in the draft
law, see id. at 475.
244 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §28(f) (2003), which states charitable trust
purposes include "purposes that are beneficial to the community."
245 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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by the territory. 46
All told, the objections to the judicial or arbitral review of
what constitutes public benefit appear to be familiar but generally
unsustainable objections to the expansion of judicial discretion.
The likely outcome of any determination of public benefit under
an odious debt arbitration would be unsurprising: highly
deferential to the opinion of public officials and likely to intervene
in exceptional cases only. But exceptional cases would present
themselves, and the existence of accountability can have a quite
formative impact on practice. Much as with US securities
regulation, where there is a common law obligation to conduct due
diligence towards the discovery and disclosure of investment risks,
there would be little litigation but a fair bit of good faith
compliance.
Going forward, two quite pressing issues remain for advocates
and critics. First, it is clearly the case that a more structured test
would be desirable than a less structured one. It would be helpful
thus to identify the types of expenditures that might be regarded as
odious ahead of time. In this regard, the high threshold used for
subjugation, if it employs the standards alluded to above,247 would
provide a relatively objective benchmark. Secondly, there is the
problem of fungibility. Is all lending to a dictatorial regime odious
because it can free up other funds to commit odious acts? Sack
clearly did not think so, but some contemporary authors take a
different view. 48 My present view is that under such a model one
would need to assess the legitimacy of every regime, rather than
the use of proceeds, and that this would be a more unstable and
more politicized endeavour. This would be quite problematic for
the reasons given in the next section. On the other hand, it is
possible to provide a clear line by saying that any loan to any non-
democratically elected government is odious. But there may be
good reasons to lend to non-democratic regimes (e.g., China,
Pakistan, countries in transition) provided they apply the funds in
a beneficial way. However, it must be correct to say that in certain
extreme cases, such as during the preparation or execution of
246 See HYDE, supra note 71, at 413.
247 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., Hanlon, supra note 1, at 113-14, 120-21, 125-26, 128 (claiming loans
made to dictators and dictatorial regimes are illegitimate and should not be repaid).
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genocide, the provision of any support to a country would
reasonably be viewed as creating an odious debt.
249
D. The Problem with the Ex Ante Model
Michael Kremer, Seema Jayachandran, and Jonathan Shafter
set aside the question of whether the doctrine of odious debt exists
in international law, preferring to show that in their view it would
be a sub-optimal choice for deterring odious lending.25° They
rather advocate the creation of an international institution that
would designate certain regimes as odious, and that thereafter
lending would be restricted unless particular transactions were pre-
authorized by the institution.' The great advantage of the
proposal is that it can provide creditors with a definitive and clear
understanding of when a loan would be odious-hence stability.
But in my view its problems may outweigh its advantages.
The first problem is that such an institution will likely
designate very few regimes as odious. It might take years to
establish, and would have to be internationally representative.
That is to say it would be composed of states presumably acting
either on consensus or super-majority, and in any event in their
self-interest and never on the basis of impartial assessments. If the
body were established within the United Nations, it would have
international legitimacy but take years to establish, and due to
geopolitics act only in the most outrageous instances. If, by
contrast, it were established within the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), or, even worse, the Group
of Seven (G7), then the process would be regarded as the outcome
of a politicized, non-objective, rich-nations' club facilitating the
furtherance of a neo-colonial economic agenda. This would
doubtless be the view taken presently in Zimbabwe, Iran, and
North Korea, with China and Russia likely to be nodding in
agreement. This would be further complicated when the despotic
allies of OECD nations would be favored, while the enemies
would likely be stigmatized regardless of their democratic
pedigree (e.g., Venezuela and Bolivia).
A second problem is that declaring a regime, rather than a set
249 This issue is discussed further in my Restatement, supra note 4.
250 See Kremer et al., supra note 1, at 14.
251 See id. at 18-22.
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of actions, to be odious is a rather 'nuclear' type of option and is
unlikely to be deployed until the regime reaches pariah status. The
international community's (a)pathetic responses to crises in
Rwanda, Darfur, the Congo, and East Timor are testament to its
reluctance to take minor steps in the face of horrendous acts.
Further, if the international community were attempting non-
confrontational diplomacy with a country, the odious debt button
could not realistically be pushed. Obviously, debts may clearly be
linked to odious actions well before the option is taken.
Both the first and second problems lead inexorably to the third,
and indeed perhaps the most significant problem: if a given regime
is not so designated, a creditor can rely on this fact in lending to it.
In other words, and quite ironically, the idea of calling this model
the "due diligence" model is highly misleading. It would
eliminate the need for any diligence at all. At one point, I was
inclined to suggest that the ex ante model could exist in tandem
with a customary international law model. But it soon became
apparent that the stability conferred by the model would be
stability of the very wrong kind. It would stabilize lending to any
government that is not designated as odious through a possibly
illegitimate procedure that is likely only to be used in the rarest of
instances.
Proponents of this model may well retort that the system might
have a modest outcome, but it is better than a purported
international law exception to the rule of repayment that either
does not exist, or, if it did and was asserted, would either raise
premiums or shut down lending. 2 It is this final point that runs
through a number of sophisticated critiques that I now turn to
addressing by way of closure.
VI. Odious Debt Proof Lending
A common policy concern and chief justification of the ex ante
proposal is that application of the traditional doctrine would render
lending unstable.253 If defining a debt as odious is not a precise
endeavor, then how are creditors to ensure before the fact that their
loans will not be considered odious? In my view this argument is
vastly overstated, however, because it fails to appreciate the
252 See id. at 21.
253 Id.; see Paulus, supra note 1, at 91-92.
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difference between the certainty with which an odious debt can be
identified, and the certainty with which it can be avoided. The
latter is much more predictable, because it can basically be
reduced to a procedure. There are three easy steps. If these three
steps were followed in good faith, it would in my opinion be
virtually impossible to apply the doctrine to the loan in a
legitimate fashion.254
The first step would be to ensure that there was consent.
Kremer et al., attach some significance to determining whether
there was consent for a given loan, but in reality the matter today
is not very complicated. Was the government elected in elections
either ordinarily deemed to be free and fair, or certified as such by
elections monitors? If determining that elections were free and
fair presents the enormous philosophical complications
complained of in their article, then just what are elections monitors
doing these days? To establish some measure of security on this
point, creditors need to examine a number of reports such as the
U.S. Department of State human rights reports, international
media coverage of elections, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and
United Nations reports. They can then make a considered
judgment about the fairness of the electoral process, and record it
as a standard part of their due diligence. What they need to
ascertain, in such a context, is not whether the elections mirrored
some Platonic idea of "consent," but rather whether there is
considerable doubt about the propriety of the electoral process. If
there is not, there is no application of the odious debt doctrine and
the creditor is assured. If there is a risk of doubt, then the creditor
must take precautions at step two of the process. It should be
noted here that it is naturally possible that democratic
governments will be corrupt and the creditor may well be aware or
actively participate in the corruption of the state representative. In
such case, it is a necessary presumption that loans procured
through corruption are necessarily without the consent of the
population notwithstanding the democratic nature of the
government.255
254 I am particularly grateful to Mitu Gulati and Lee Buchheit for comments on this
section.
255 This idea is developed further in my Restatement, supra note 4. It is there
pointed out that it is conceivable that a democratically elected legislature could
unequivocally ratify a measure providing for what seems like extravagant personal
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Under step two, the creditor must undertake to ensure that the
loan is contracted for the benefit of the state. When dealing with a
non-democratic regime, then, certain types of contracts would
effectively be off limits: loans for general, unspecified purposes,
loans for the purchase or maintenance of military hardware, loans
for supporting flagrant breaches of international law, and loans for
purposes that, under extenuating circumstances, might possibly be
linked with forms of subjugation identified in Part V.B above.
The best and most secure method, in the same spirit as the Kelo
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, is to ensure that funds are
applied to purposes identified as part of an integrated development
plan.256 This would not only virtually guarantee that the loan is
not susceptible to later being identified as odious, but it makes
sound financial sense. Indeed, it is virtually unimaginable that any
public debt in North America or Western Europe be contracted in
any other way. It would be possible to identify a range of
instances that are presumptively for the public benefit, such as
education, relief of the poor, infrastructure (depending on the
circumstances), industrial finance, housing, etc. But it seems this
is not necessary as it will be quite clear from the circumstances
when a proposed purpose falls safely on one side of the public
benefit line. And where it is not clear, the creditor can either insist
that the particular purpose be removed or take further steps to
quell uncertainties.
One difficult issue in this process would be loan refinancing.
What if a dictator wishes to borrow to refinance a loan that itself
has dubious legitimacy under the terms of the doctrine? My
present view is that if the refinancing were determined to be
necessary in the interests of the country as part of an integrated
development plan, it will be impossible to challenge the decision
as being odious for the country. Some may object that this would
allow dictators to whitewash odious loans. But the contrary view
would tie the hands of a borrower when it may well be necessary
to take advantage of a restructuring that is in the bona fide
enrichment to foreign eyes. There is a presumption that it would not.
256 There is clearly room for discussion about what would constitute an integrated
development plan, and what type of consultation would be desirable, but that task is for
another day. The Supreme Court's understanding is likely sufficient for present
purposes.
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interests of the country and a democratic election or referendum
seems genuinely problematic. 7 So although the possibility of a
whitewash exists, it seems the trade-off is between allowing that
and possibly preventing need for refinancing. At the moment, it
seems best not to tie borrowers and creditors' hands too greatly.
There is a second aspect of assuring that the purpose is for a
public benefit. There would need to be an accountability regime
put in place that tracks funds from disbursement to application.
Otherwise creditors could go through the motions but then turn a
blind eye to the actual end use of the funds. Developing such an
accountability regime would not be a difficult process. A
segregation of funds and annual audited financial reporting to a
committee of bondholders or the creditor(s) would almost
certainly meet the need. If more nuance were needed, there is
little reason to think that international auditing and consulting
firms could not provide it.
The third and final step would be for the creditor to ensure
that it is not subjectively aware of any odious purposes. One way
to demonstrate good faith on the issue of purpose is for creditors to
hold a meeting to discuss the proposed use of proceeds and the
beneficial nature of such proceeds for the state, to express any
concerns about particular extenuating circumstances, and to obtain
and later incorporate into the agreement any needed
representations and warranties about not applying funds towards
any dubious circumstances. The meeting can be recorded in
minutes and it would become part of the due diligence record. It
would be necessary in this process that the participating firms and
creditor itself has carried out some form of bona fide pre-
negotiations assessment. This can be done by examining reputable
human rights reports, United Nations reports, regional
organization reports, U.S. Department of State reports, etc. None
of this is beyond the powers or competency of any corporate law
firm now involved in sovereign lending. The added costs would
be marginal.
Naturally, creditors will not wish to appear to intrude deeply
into the borrower's public agenda. There are concerns of comity
to be observed in sovereign negotiations. But a polite exchange in
257 Pakistan and China might be relevant examples of where this type of problem
might arise. A country in transition may be another example.
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which views are aired and legal risks are discussed is not a heavy
infringement upon the dignity of the state. The resulting paper-
trail will demonstrate the creditor's diligence, provided that live
issues are reflected adequately in the loan contract. Above all, it
must be recalled at this stage that these additional requirements
arise only where creditors deal with non-democratic regimes. Is
this too high a transaction cost when lending money to dictators?
Hardly. If the creditor needs to offer a justification for requiring
this higher level of scrutiny, it can readily point to the resurgent
interest in the odious debt doctrine and massive restructurings that
occurred in Nigeria, Argentina, and Iraq.
Given the extraordinarily high costs of repudiation, and the
relatively easy procedural scheme presented here, there is no
reason to think that creditors could not take this step and increase
the security of their credit arrangements without prompting any
greater market instability. It may be observed that most banks or
domestic corporate lenders conduct much the same type of
diligence in day-to-day lending, as do private companies doing
business in foreign countries where there are significant
investment risks. In short, it makes business sense. More
importantly, perhaps, creditors may well live up to a moral
responsibility that no one publicly doubts: to ensure that they do
not lend support to non-democratic regimes that are harming or
defrauding their own populations.
VII.Conclusion
This article aimed to define the odious debt doctrine with some
degree of precision, review the key authorities, draw attention to
key areas of disagreement about the status of the doctrine, and to
shed light on issues not adequately discussed in the secondary
literature. The conclusions can be put simply. First, the doctrine
of odious debt must be viewed as an exception to the rules of
repayment. The rules themselves, particularly the rule in state
succession, have been subject to important qualifications quite
apart from the idea of odious debt. There is ample reason to
believe that repayment of what may well have been regarded as
odious debts was essentially done without recognizing the
existence of any binding obligation to repay. When examining
the origins of scholarly treatment of odious debts, one sees the
definitions of three prominent authors as having exercised an
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important influence over the development of the concept: Sack,
Feilchenfeld, and Bedjaoui. Other writers, such as Hyde and
O'Connell, also made relevant and important contributions. The
upshot of the historical analysis is that there is a contemporary
usage of the doctrine that advocates the view, drawn mostly from
Sack, that a debt is odious if it was contracted without the consent
of the population, without benefit to it, and both these are known
to the creditor.
The definition of odious debt thus having been made clear, it
was important to examine the main sources of international law
which are cited in favor of the existence of such a doctrine.
Several instances of state practice are alluded to, but the
controversial nature of certain examples is not fully canvassed. As
for treaties, it is acknowledged that many treaties may be relevant
to the doctrine. However, the most relevant treaty, unlikely ever
to enter into force, is the product of a drafting history that suggests
that odious debt was regarded as unenforceable in cases of state
succession under that Convention. General principles of law such
as abuse of rights, equitable obligations and defenses, and the law
of agency show considerable though qualified promise as sources
for an odious debt exception to the rule of repayment. The
decisions of various national courts and international tribunals
display a marked ambivalence over the existence of the doctrine,
whereas the scholarly commentary seems divided on most issues.
Scholars familiar with the international law of state succession
appear to find that odious debts are not required to be apportioned
after succession. However, a clear majority of authors presently
appear to find that there is little authority (outside cases of
corruption or bribery) for the doctrine's application in cases of
government succession.
Having discussed the authorities, Part IV proceeded to identify
some of the key issues that continue to plague the debate. It was
shown that the distinction between cases of state and government
succession was, for the purposes of odious debt, completely
arbitrary and that the structure of international law and recent state
practice have changed in a way suggestive of a possible emerging
doctrine of odious debt in cases of government succession. I next
highlighted the possibility of confusion between various types of
odious debts, and outlined, quite briefly, four broad types of
odious debt: war debts; subjugation debts; illegal occupation
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debts; and fraudulent, illegal and corruption debts. Understanding
the differences between them allows us to avoid conceptual
confusion and see why different presumptions may operate in
different situations. The next section turned to showing why the
broad concern about a tribunal assessing 'absence of benefit' is
generally overstated. It is not beyond the competence of what
courts or tribunals can do or in fact have done and continue to do
in domestic law. It is equally clear there, however, that the
standard will doubtless be deferential to the views of public
officials and it would be likely that only egregious examples of
harmful conduct could be declared odious. I conclude Part V by
taking up and ultimately rejecting the proposal for an institution
that would declare debts odious beforehand. The idea offers some
promise as a way to allow stable lending while precluding lending
to exceptionally odious regimes. However, it is plagued by a host
of institutional design problems as by the fact that it would
eliminate rather than generate the need to conduct genuine due
diligence about the odiousness of the vast majority of borrowing
regimes.
The final Part turned to addressing a key objection that runs
through various critiques of the doctrine, namely, the idea that
recognizing the doctrine would render international lending
unstable. This view is rejected on the premise that there is a
fundamental difference between the certainty with which a debt
can be identified as odious, and the certainty with which odious
lending can be avoided. I thus set out three basic steps for odious
proof lending: (1) ascertain whether there is a considerable doubt
about democratic consent to the government; (2) if there is, ensure
the funds are for the benefit of the state, by (a) identifying
purposes ad hoc and avoiding certain obviously suspicious ones,
and (b) by requiring the provision of an integrated state
development plan, and (c) establishing an accountability regime
that tracks the use of proceeds; and (3) ensure creditor diligence
by discussing and contractually warranting the beneficial use of
proceeds. I contend that if this process were followed in good
faith, it would be highly implausible that any tribunal or
government would find that a creditor had created an odious debt.
Since the steps are both cost-effective and within the powers of
existing financial and legal institutions, there is little reason to
believe that lending would become substantially more expensive
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or unstable.
The ultimate conclusion from all of this is that the doctrine of
odious debt has a varied pedigree, but advocates have based their
claims in a substantial number of legal sources. It is hoped that
this article helped to clarify the terms of the debate and the
remaining areas of disagreement. Whether the doctrine as
traditionally conceived or as restated by various authors will
ultimately be recognized in cases of government and state
succession remains an open question. But it is beyond any
commentator's doubt that odious debts are morally odious. This
article further demonstrated that creditors can eliminate them from
international lending without incurring any substantial cost. There
is thus little need for creditors to wait for scholars to clarify the
law. Rather, there is a clear and urgent program of action for them
that could make the odious debt debate a matter of legal history
alone.
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